Is financial inclusion good for bank stability? International evidence by Ahamed, MM & Mallick, SK









This paper offers a first empirical investigation on the complementary effect of inclusive 
finance on soundness of individual banks. Using a unique database of financial access survey, 
we construct a composite index of financial inclusion for 87 countries over the period 2004 to 
2012, and then investigate a new research question as to whether the global policy drive 
towards greater financial inclusion is good for bank stability in a sample of 2,913 banks. We 
find that higher level of financial inclusion leads to greater bank stability. This complementary 
effect is more pronounced when banks have higher market power and operate in countries 
where political stability, rule of law, and regulatory environment are stronger. Exploiting cross-
country and temporal variations in the timing of inclusive banking agenda, we show that 
enabling inclusive financial environment increases soundness of banks in the treated countries 
by 36%. Taking industry data, we also show that financial inclusion exerts disproportionately 
more positive effects on growth of small firms, and firms that rely more on external finance. 
Our results highlight that the importance of ensuring inclusive financial system is not only a 
development goal but also an issue that should be prioritised by banks as such a policy drive is 
good for their stability.  
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“What improves the circumstances of the greater part can never be regarded as inconveniency to 
the whole. No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which by far the greater part of the 
numbers are poor and miserable”. 
Adam Smith (1776) 
1. Introduction 
While the recent empirical literature provides evidence on the positive role of  financial 
inclusion in promoting wellbeing of households and economic growth through extending access 
of the disadvantaged groups to basic financial services in the form of greater use of formal bank 
account and savings, little attention has been devoted to investigate whether such a development 
goal has ramifications on soundness of banks.1,2 The most challenging issues for the financial 
institutions to facilitate access to finance are the high operating costs and the risk associated with 
1 See, for example: Wurgler (2000); Beck et al. (2000); Klapper et al. (2006); Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2008); Demirgüç-
Kunt et al. (2015); Burgess and Pande (2005), and Banerjee et al. (2013), in India; Bruhn and Love (2009), and Bruhn 
and Love (2014), in Mexico; Karlan and Zinman (2010), in South Africa; Dupas and Robinson (2009), in Kenya. 




                                                 
servicing, monitoring and administering loans to individual households and small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) who often lack required documentations, collaterals and credit histories (e.g., 
Conning, 1999; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008, henchforth DBH; Hermes et al., 2011). Broadening 
access of the low income groups to formal financial services has therefore always been perceived 
as an antagonistic strategy, which might dampen the performance of banks.3 Using a large sample 
of bank-level data on 2913 banks across 87 countries over the period 2004 to 2012, this paper 
focuses on a specific dimension of financial development–financial sector inclusiveness–and an 
important regulatory issue at the micro level–bank stability, and supports the opposing view that 
inclusive finance and bank performance are indeed complementary, employing a range of 
parametric and semi-parametric methods.4  
In recent years, formal financial institutions are increasingly searching for new 
opportunities and markets, and seeing the benefits of micro-finance style of operations.5 Since 
formal financial institutions have superior scale, skill and technological capacity (Peachy and Roe, 
2006; DBH, 2008; Beck et al., 2011), many of them have extended their networks towards poor 
households and SMEs for higher profitability (Hermes et al., 2011). By exploiting technological 
advancements they can provide basic financial services to a large number of customers especially, 
those on the lower rung of the income ladder potentially at a reduced cost. With supportive 
regulatory environment, by exploiting scale economies banks can not only ease financial 
constraints to marginalised groups and small firms, but also reduce risk and become more 
profitable at the same time (see e.g., De la Torre et al., 2010; Montgomery and Weiss, 2011).  
Since financial exclusion has been identified by policy makers as a key barrier to 
development globally, expanding banking services to people has been prioritised by governments 
to make financial inclusion a reality (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2015). Over the past decades, the 
central banks both in emerging and developed countries have taken many initiatives in conjunction 
with many multilateral agencies including the IMF, G20, the Alliance for Financial Inclusion 
(AFI), and the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) to enhance the inclusive banking 
agenda (see DBH, 2008). Furthermore, in the last two decades, the banking sectors in the 
3 Recent study suggests that almost 2.5 billion adults, just over half of the world’s adult population, do not use any 
form of formal financial services, where 19% and 72% of them are from developed and developing countries, 
respectively (Kendall et al., 2010).  
4 Throughout this paper, we use the term “bank performances” and “bank stability” interchangeably.  
5 See a detailed survey in Harper and Arora (2005) on why commercial banks are so much interested in micro-
finance style of operations. 
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developing countries observed increasing presence of foreign-owned banks, which are more 
sophisticated and equipped to attract larger firms and high-net-worth individuals, making 
domestically owned banks to search for new markets that were previously underserved and/or 
excluded (See DBH, 2008, p.78).6 At the same time, over the past decade, many countries have 
undertaken a large number of banking regulatory reforms (Barth et al., 2008), which perhaps have 
had a meaningful effect on levels of financial inclusion and hence on the soundness of financial 
institutions. Given the changed regulatory environment, it therefore would be interesting to 
investigate how financial inclusion impacts banking stability.  
To our knowledge, there is no direct empirical evidence on the channels through which 
financial inclusion affects bank stability. Existing literature implicitly indicates several potential 
channels through which financial inclusion may influence soundness of banks or risk-taking (see 
Section 2). By reaching out to more customers, banks may garner ample cheap retail deposits while 
reducing reliance on volatile wholesale funding. They may have new opportunity to allocate 
necessary credits for more productive entrepreneurial activities while reducing distance with 
borrowers – reduced distance alleviates asymmetric information problems and aids banks to 
decrease default rates through underwriting sound loan contracts. Therefore, financial outreach–
banks’ branch network expansion, should influence the levels of bank stability.7 
Despite the remarkable benefits of access to finance on financial development and hence 
to inclusive economic growth, there is no existence of empirical literature on the issues related to 
bank stability. Perhaps the most closely related paper is the seminal work by Beck et al. (2007b), 
henchforth BDM who investigate the determinants of financial sector outreach, and its role on 
firm’s financing obstacles. They find that firms report less severe financing obstacles in countries 
with better outreach. More recently Beck et al. (2014b) investigate the link between bank branch 
outreach and firm’s tax avoidance. The limited research in this area is somewhat obvious given 
the limitations of supply- and demand-side data availability on access. In addition, the lack of 
development of reliable quantitative index of financial inclusion hitherto restricts explicit analysis 
of the effects of inclusive financial systems on various aspects of bank performance.  
6 Using survey data for over 16,500 households, Beck and Brown (2014) show international evidence that foreign 
banks “cherry pick” financially transparent customers. 
7 More recently Goetz et al. (2015) show that the geographic expansion of bank holding company (BHC) across U.S. 
metropolitan statistical areas lowers BHC risk. 
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This study fills this gap and makes several contributions to the literature. First, while most 
of the empirical papers assess the effect of financial inclusion on various socio-economic 
indicators (e.g., Butler and Cornaggia, 2011; Allen et al., 2013; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2013a; 
Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2013b), or use disaggregated single indicator of financial inclusion (e.g., 
BDM, 2007), this paper constructs a multidimensional index of financial inclusion at country level, 
and uses to see the effect on bank-level stability in a cross-country analysis, including developed, 
developing, and transition economies while controlling for bank-specific, country-specific, and 
institutional characteristics that one typically encounters in financial development literature. Our 
financial inclusion index has some advantages over the measures used in the literature. 
Specifically, we use IMF Financial Access Survey (FAS) dataset to construct a composite index 
of financial inclusion incorporating three different dimensions, such as accessibility, availability 
and usage that deem to have substantial impact on inclusiveness in the financial sector. As these 
dimensions are highly correlated with each other, we capture common variation among them using 
principal component analysis (PCA). Then, we develop an index of financial inclusion deriving 
weight of each dimension, which is useful because it can allow us to construct a composite index 
that enables comparison across countries minimising concerns about measurement error. The time 
series dimension of this index allows us to exploit within country variation in the inclusiveness of 
the financial sector, and explore the effect on bank stability in a systematic way. We also test the 
validity and robustness of our index using data from the World Bank global financial inclusion 
index (henceforth Global Findex) and World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES). 
Second, addressing the impact of financial inclusion on bank stability is non-existent both 
in the academic and regulatory circles.8 This paper is the first, to our knowledge, to address this 
research agenda in a cross-country setting to contribute to this contemporary policy issue related 
to financial development and financial inclusion using bank level data. Most of the evidences are 
either anecdotal9 and/or use simple analyses at macro-level (e.g., Hannig and Jansen, 2010; Han 
and Melecky, 2013; Morgan and Pontines, 2014). Third, we use instrumental variable (IV) 
estimator to extract the exogenous component of financial inclusion while controlling for 
unobserved bank characteristics that might affect both financial inclusion and stability reducing 
8 Throughout this paper, we use the term “access-stability” and “financial inclusion-bank stability” synonymously.  




                                                 
concerns about endogeneity. Fourth, our paper contributes to the literature that explores the 
determinants of banking stability (e.g., Berger et al., 2009; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Houston et 
al., 2010; Beck et al., 2013; Anginer et al., 2014). Fifth, our study offers in-depth evidence on the 
impact of financial inclusion on banking stability for a large number of developed and developing 
countries over a longer period, during a period of global financial instability for which regulators 
were upbeat about broadening access of the marginalised groups to formal financial services while 
keeping bank’s excessive risk taking at check, especially in the post crisis era. As from a 
supervisory and policy perspective it is important to understand whether broadening access of the 
isolated poor people to formal financial services is complementary or antagonistic to the soundness 
of banks, the results of this study should prove useful to researchers and policymakers alike.   
Sixth, in the presence of greater bank competition, it is important to know whether 
financial inclusion can still promote average bank soundness. The cross-country nature of our 
dataset allows us to explore the role of bank competition and institutional environment on the 
access-stability relationship, which are of particular interest for policy. In countries with better 
quality of institutions, the effect of financial inclusion on bank stability is more pronounced, while 
in the presence of greater bank competition, inclusive banking is still beneficial for bank stability 
and therefore banks should embrace inclusive finance as promoted by policy makers around the 
world. Finally, we run an array of sensitivity checks using other proxies of financial inclusion, 
bank competition and stability, by executing alternative estimation approaches (panel data vs. 
cross section) and by employing different sample specifications, particularly running regression 
for the sample of developing countries. We also exploit cross-country and temporal variations in 
the timing of inclusive banking agenda, and unearth a causal evidence that enabling inclusive 
financial environment is good for bank stability using differences-in-difference approach. To 
alleviate any selection bias and confounding factors in the treatment effects, we also check the 
robustness of our results for matched samples using a range of matching estimators.  
Finally, our study complements finance-growth literature. Since higher levels of financial 
inclusion are likely to influence overall supply of credit, it is likely to affect the level of growth of 
firms. Therefore, following the seminal work by Rajan and Zingales (1998), and a recent study of 
Beck et al. (2008), we shed some interesting insights into the channels through which greater 
financial inclusion alleviates financing obstacles of private firms, which in turn affect firm growth. 
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Inclusive financial sector may induce banks to allocate credit to small firms, and to firms in those 
industries that are in need of more external finance, which enhances overall economic growth. 
 Our results indicate that there is a strong link between financial inclusion and bank 
stability. In particular, the higher the degree of financial inclusion, the better the banks’ 
performance is, in terms of reducing risks. The evidence also suggests that any beneficial effects 
of financial inclusion on bank stability tend to be more pronounced in banking sectors with less 
competition. As banks expand their operations towards areas that were previously underserved 
and/or excluded, they are able to reduce excessive risk taking when they have higher market power. 
We also investigate the influence of institutional settings on the access-stability relationship, and 
find that the institutional environment in which banks operate reinforces the complementarity 
effects of financial inclusion on soundness of banks. Specifically, greater freedom of expression, 
political stability, regulatory quality, and rule of law enhance the positive relationship between 
financial inclusion and bank stability.  
As we derive our financial inclusion measure form the IMF’s FAS dataset by using supply 
side data at the aggregate level, we have tried to add as many dimensions as possible to get a 
comprehensive picture of overall financial inclusion of a country, and we have checked the 
robustness of our results running the same regressions using different measures of financial 
inclusion, and found unambiguously similar results. 
The remaining part of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 talks about the 
dimensions of financial inclusion and discusses various channels through which inclusive financial 
sectors can affect soundness of banks. Section 3 describes the data and descriptive statistics and 
Section 4 outlines the empirical models. Section 5 discusses the empirical results with sensitivity 
analyses. Section 6 relates financial inclusion to the level of industry growth. Section 7 provides 
evidence on the inclusive banking agenda and bank stability, while Section 8 concludes with some 
policy implications.  
 
2. Inclusive financial sector and its complementary effect on bank stability 
We hypothesise that broadening access of all economic agents to formal financial 
services–greater financial inclusion–is likely to have important influence on the degree of bank 
stability. In this section, we introduce the various components of financial inclusion, which are 
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incorporated in the construction of composite index of financial inclusion and discuss their 
potential effects on bank stability. 
2.1. Inclusive financial systems 
In an inclusive financial sector, any member of the economy, irrespective of background, 
should enjoy the ease of access, availability, affordability, and usage of the basic financial services 
provided. While measuring an index of financial inclusion one should therefore incorporate as 
many dimensions as possible that should have an impact on inclusiveness of the financial sector. 
Information on various dimensions can be obtained from demand-side surveys, such as the Global 
Findex database, an individual-level database comprised of survey data collected over the 2011 
calendar year covering more than 150,000 adults in 148 economies. Since the costs and collection 
of survey data are demanding, and the availability of such data for longer period is unreasonable, 
we therefore focus on supply-side data–FAS database–that were collected by BDM (2007) with 
the joint effort of World Bank for 2003-2004, and later on extended by the Consultative Group to 
Assist the Poor (CGAP) and by the IMF.  
Using FAS database, we measure the index of Financial Inclusion for 87 countries for the 
period 2004 to 2012. In general, there is a consensus, at least from the regulator’s perspective, that 
financial inclusion can be measured using four dimensions, namely the penetration/accessibility, 
availability, affordability, and usage. Given the data availability constraint, the variable we use for 
each dimension often requires proxies. For the penetration dimension, we use the number of bank 
accounts per 1,000 populations to integrate the depth of the financial access.10 The availability 
dimension is used to account for the pervasiveness of outreach of the financial sector in terms of 
banks’ physical outlets, as physical distance to physical point of financial services deems to be an 
important impediment to financial inclusion (see Allen et al., 2014). We use two classes of 
penetration of banking services i.e., demographic and geographic penetration of bank branch and 
ATM (e.g., see BDM, 2007; Beck et al., 2014b). For the demographic penetration, we use the 
number of bank branches and number of ATMs per 100,000 people, and for the geographic 
penetration we use the number of bank branches and number of ATMs per 1,000 square 
10 The actual representation of penetration dimension would have been had data of the number of people having 
banking accounts rather than the number of accounts per capita. The caveat is that in the latter case the number of 
“banked” population might be overestimated due to dormant accounts and/or double count of accounts of the same 
person.  
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kilometres.11 The affordability dimension can also be classified into various sub-categories that 
include “transaction costs” and “ease of transaction”.12 Since the data on the affordability 
dimension is rather scarce, this dimension is not considered in the computation of financial 
inclusion index. For the usage dimension, we use the volume of credit plus deposit relative to the 
GDP. BDM (2007) investigate financial sector outreach and its determinants by using cross-
country data to identify common trends across the abovementioned indicators. It is easier for the 
general public to comprehend and compare an indicator across countries that is composite in nature 
engrained with many correlated indicators (OECD, 2008). In this paper, we overcome the 
shortcomings, and build upon BDM (2007) to introduce a multidimensional weighted index of all 
variables as a measure of financial inclusion (see Section 3.2 for details). In our analysis, we use 
both the composite index and the three dimensions to explore the relationship between financial 
inclusion and banking stability. 
2.2. Financial inclusion and bank stability 
From a theoretical perspective, it is a priori not clear whether inclusive financial sector is 
good for bank stability (i.e., less risk taking). Through financial outreach–geographical and 
demographical bank’s branch network penetration, banks can serve a wide range of customers 
potentially at a reduced cost once necessary infrastructures are in place (see Berger et al., 2010). 
By exploiting expertise i.e., managerial and technical expertise, they can improve operating 
efficiency and revenues as they have cheaper funding, new lending and investment opportunities 
(see e.g., Saunders, 1994; Berger and DeYoung, 2001; Deng and Elyasiani, 2008; Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Huizinga, 2010).  
It is argued in the literature that retail deposits are sluggish, insensitive to risks and 
provide a stable cheaper source of long term funding (e.g., see  Calomiris and Kahn, 1991; Song 
and Thakor, 2007), compared to wholesale funding which is extremely volatile and often costly 
(e.g., see Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; Huang and Ratnovski, 2011; Poghosyan and Čihak, 
11 As the distribution of bank branches and ATMs are not always uniform and often concentrated in urban areas of the 
country and provide access to some individuals using area- and population-based ratios may undermine the true 
penetration of banking services (BDM, 2007). 
12 Having information on affordability dimension would certainly improve the quality of financial inclusion index, but 
comparable macro data for a large number of countries is hard to get by. For example, the annual fees charged to 
customers for ATM cards and/or accounts i.e. “transaction costs” and the minimum amount and/or document requires 
opening savings or checking accounts i.e. “ease of transaction”.  
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2011).13 Huang and Ratnovski (2011) show that wholesale financiers are prone to very mild 
negative information or rumours, and most of the time they are reluctant to rollover short-term 
funding as they have access to the information of the quality of bank projects. While comparing 
informed and arm’s length debt, Rajan (1992) finds that the informed debt holders (i.e., wholesale 
funders) could discontinue funds for a project with negative present value unless they are 
compensated with higher interest rate. Recent empirical studies also show that banks relying more 
on retail deposits rather than on wholesale funding were more stable during the recent financial 
crisis (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; Poghosyan and Čihak, 2011). Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Huizinga (2010), using a sample of listed banks in 101 countries for the period 1995-2007, 
also find that higher level of non-deposit funding shares increases banking fragility. Ratnovski and 
Huang (2009) show that the ample retail depository funding that was the key factor behind the 
relative resilience of Canadian banks during the 2008 turmoil. Moreover, during the recent credit 
crunch when the wholesale funding dried up it was the diversified retail deposit base that cushioned 
financial institutions from fragility (see Hannig and Jansen, 2010). While banks extend deposit 
facilities to a large pool of customers they are able to attract a large number of small retail deposits 
which are often cheaper than wholesale funding.14 Therefore, greater diversification in funding 
strategy associated with financial inclusion in mobilising deposits should reduce risks and funding 
costs of banks, enhancing bank stability. For example: during financial distress when panic gets 
into depositors, they run on banks to withdraw their savings (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Shin, 
2009). Recently, Han and Melecky (2013) find international evidence for the period 2006-2010 
that, by dint of the law of large number, correlated deposit withdrawals (i.e., bank run) could be 
mitigated during stressful times if bank deposits are more diversified i.e., held by more individuals 
and firms.  
13 The retail deposits are sluggish because the withdrawals of them are motivated by the individual depositors liquidity 
need, and thus it is predictable based on the law of large numbers. In addition, they are insensitive to risk partly 
because of the deposit insurance provided by the government (e.g., Kim et al., 2003; Song and Thakor, 2007). For 
example, in the all recent bank failures (e.g., Continental Illinois, Northern Rock, IndyMac), it was short-term 
wholesale financiers who exited faster than retail depositors without having significant losses. In the case of Northern 
Rock, retail depositors run on bank took place after it had nearly exhausted its liquid assets to pay short-term wholesale 
financiers (Shin, 2009; Goldsmith-Pinkham and Yorulmazer, 2010). 
14 Several governments, especially in the developing countries, are making financial inclusion an essential part of their 
national plans. For example, on 28 August 2014, government of India has launched the ‘Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan 
Yojana’ (Prime Minister's People Money Scheme), with the explicit aim of removing financial exclusion. Though this 
scheme has an option for opening new bank accounts with zero balance, banks were able to garner deposits of ₹1500 
crore (US$240 million) within two weeks of the launch of the scheme, with around 30.2 million new accounts. 
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The greater financial inclusion is also likely to influence the overall level of lending 
opportunity of banks. By reaching out to unbanked/underbanked areas while extending small 
credits, banks can reduce distance and build strong relationship with customers. Recent literature 
shows that distance between lender and borrower undermines efficacy of banking services through 
intensification of asymmetric information problem (Degryse and Ongena, 2005; Hauswald and 
Marquez, 2006; Mian, 2006; Deng and Elyasiani, 2008). Hauswald and Marquez (2006) develop 
a model and show that lender can get precise signal about borrower’s quality if it decreases distance 
with borrower. In addition, banks can also reduce informational asymmetry by obtaining 
proprietary information about borrowers while providing access to basic financial services (e.g., 
Black, 1975; Fama, 1985; Rajan, 1992). To deal with less creditworthy and clients who often lack 
collateral, banks require to adopt lending techniques that are based on soft information (i.e., 
relationship lending). Exploiting this lending technology, they can also reduce moral hazards and 
adverse selection problems, and get comparative advantage over other financial institutions 
seeking informational rents (see Sharpe, 1990; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Buch et al., 2012).15 For 
example, using US bank holding companies, Akhigbe and Whyte (2003) and Deng and Elyasiani 
(2008) find that geographic diversification enhances bank value and risk reduction. Deng and 
Elyasiani (2008) also find that diversification across more remote areas (in our case, the areas 
where financial services are hardly available) is associated with greater value enhancement and a 
slighter risk-reduction effect. Therefore, when banks diversify to regions where more unbanked 
population are located, they are better able to understand the nuances of the local household/firm 
environment, which should reduce the probability of default rates, cost of monitoring and enhance 
lender-borrower proximity, and relationship, which in turn enhances larger risk-reduction.16  
In contrast, if bank attracts a large pool of extremely low creditworthy borrowers due to 
financial inclusion it can derail banking stability as they require to extend small credits to a wider 
15 Linking three unique datasets, in a more recent study, Beck et al. (2014a) show that relationship lending alleviates 
SMEs’ credit constraints during a cyclical downturn, and this effect is strongest for smaller and more opaque firms, 
and in regions where the downturn is more severe. 
16 It may also be the case that geographic diversification is associated with banking stability loss due to informational 
asymmetries binding with poor households or small firms. It may also occur due to lack of managerial and technical 
expertise, agency problems related to complex organisational and product structure (Acharya et al., 2006). 
Investigating the impact of geographic diversification, Acharya et al. (2006) on Italy and Goetz et al. (2013) on U.S., 
did not find any improvement in the risk-return trade-off and market valuations, respectively.  
 10 
                                                 
set of borrowers.17 In a recent study of Adasme et al. (2006) with respect to the portfolio of Chilean 
banks, however find that losses on large loans are greater and unpredictable than losses on small 
ones.18 It suggests that providing access to credits to a large number of small borrowers bank 
should be able to reduce monitoring costs and volatility of earnings. In addition, disbursing small 
loans is always a routine and standard task, which involves less monitoring and screening cost. 
Moreover, according to portfolio theory, diversified banks can decrease earning volatility and 
adverse risk-taking incentives through cross-subsidisation (Boot and Schmeits, 2000). Rossi et al. 
(2009) on Austrian banking data find that increased diversification of loan portfolio requires banks 
to keep lower future provisioning, which in turn results in a reduction of realised risk. Using 
conventional and Islamic banks for the period 2002-2010, Shaban et al. (2014) find that 
profitability is one of the main reasons for Indonesian banks to lend to small businesses. They also 
find that greater diversification of loans towards small businesses is associated with lower risk 
provisions for Indonesian banks. Therefore, by extending access of a large pool of customers to 
small credits, banks can decrease potential monitoring costs and losses compared to large loans, 
which in turn enhances soundness of banks.  
Above all, since greater financial inclusion increases the supply of bank credits, which is 
always the vital and cheaper source of external finance for SMEs (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1997; 
Berger and Udell, 1998), it also aids in the growth of small firms, and firms that need external 
finances. Literature evokes that financial development (i.e., financial inclusion) disproportionately 
helps industries with technologically larger shares of small firms, and also the industries with 
higher dependence on external finance (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Beck et al., 2008). Since more 
inclusive financial systems will ameliorate market frictions–i.e., informational opacity and 
transaction costs–small firms and firms that rely more on external finance in the economy will 
grow faster because the relatively easier access to credits. With the increasing supply of credits, 
borrowers will get favourable loan contracts, which would be vital to disincentivise borrowers 
from asset substitution–where borrowers utilise the funds to invest in riskier projects, which in 
turn enhances bank stability as borrower’s default probability decreased.  
17 Regarding the recent subprime crisis, Rajan (2011) elucidates that “easy credit” as a mechanism to reduce income 
inequality can create a “fault line” along the financial system undermining the financial stability owing to enormous 
stresses. 
18 Using randomized experiments, De Mel et al. (2008) in Sri Lanka and McKenzie and Woodruff (2008) in Mexico, 
estimate capital returns to investment in microenterprises, and find that micro-entrepreneurs are indeed able to pay the 
high interest rates charged by microfinance institutions. 
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Apart from the channels discussed above, there are some exogenous risks (i.e., natural 
disasters, social and political disruptions) that can undermine efficient financial intermediation and 
stability (Hawkins, 2006). Therefore, our final channel is the social and political stability. A 
number of recent studies find that greater financial inclusion: reduces income inequality and 
poverty (e.g., Burgess and Pande, 2005; Beck et al., 2007a; Bruhn and Love, 2014); increases 
employment (e.g., Prasad, 2010); improves mental well-being (e.g., Karlan and Zinman, 2010; 
Angelucci et al., 2013); favours education (e.g., Flug et al., 1998); helps making better decision 
(e.g., Mani et al., 2013); and enhances new firm creation (e.g., Guiso et al., 2004; Klapper et al., 
2006; Banerjee et al., 2013).19 For example: using state-level data in India, Burgess and Pande 
(2005) find that expanding bank branches in the rural areas had a significant positive impact on 
poverty alleviation.20 Similarly, recently, Bruhn and Love (2014) provide evidence from Mexico 
using randomized evaluation suggesting that facilitating better access to finance to the poorest of 
the poor have positive impact on poverty alleviation. They also find that access to financial services 
has positive impact on economic development through the channel of keeping individuals 
employed and fostering the survival and creation of informal business. As the nature of SMEs 
business operations is labour intensive, Prasad (2010) observes that financial constraint to SMEs 
has adverse effects on employment growth. On a study of Compartamos borrowers in Mexico, 
Angelucci et al. (2013) find that access to credit does have a positive impact on mental well-being. 
Therefore, the positive effect of financial inclusion on various key socio-economic indicators is 
indispensable to inclusive economic growth and sociopolitical stability, which in turn could lead 
to greater efficiency in the financial intermediations and soundness of banks (see e.g., Hannig and 
Jansen, 2010; Khan, 2011; Cull et al., 2012). 
Overall, since providing access to finance seems to have multiple positive effects on many 
aspects of the economy including banking operations, we therefore view the link between financial 
inclusion and bank stability as ultimately an empirical question.  
19 Bauchet et al. (2011) summarize evidence from randomized evaluations of microfinance. The general findings of 
these studies are that financial services have positive impact on numerous microeconomic indicators, including self-
employment, business activities, household consumption, and well-being. 
20 Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), using branching deregulation implemented by different U.S. states over the period 
mid-1970s to mid-1990s, find that the relaxation of intra- and interstate branching had positive impact on economic 
growth.  
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3. Data and descriptive statistics 
To investigate the relationship between financial inclusion and bank stability, we draw 
data from a number of sources: (1) the bank level dataset compiled from the BankScope database 
(provided by Bureau van Dijk and Fitch Ratings) that contains detailed balance sheet and income 
statement information for both public and private banks in any given country; (2) the macro data 
compiled from the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI); (3) the instruments for IV 
regressions are collected form the Heritage Foundation: Doing Business database, and 
Entrepreneurship Database; (4) the variables used to construct financial inclusion index is 
compiled from the IMF’s FAS database; (5) six indicators of institutional quality is taken from 
Kaufmann et al. (2010) Governance Index; (6) firm-level indicators are taken from the World Bank 
Enterprise Surveys (WBES) to check the relationship between financial inclusion index and firms’ 
access to finance/firms’ financing obstacles; and (7) industry-level data on share and growth rate 
of value added are taken from the Industrial Statistics Database (INDSTAT4) published in 2010 
by the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO). Data on external finance 
dependence (EFD) and small firm share (<N employees) of 36 industries are from Rajan and 
Zingales (1998) and Beck et al. (2008), respectively. Our dataset comprises of 2,913 commercial 
banks, cooperative banks and Islamic banks (13,836 bank-year observations) in 87 countries over 
the time period 2004-2012, which represent, respectively 57.4%, 41.3%, and 1.3% of the sample. 
Since the objective of this study is to investigate the impact of financial inclusion on bank stability, 
we apply a number of selection criteria to obtain our sample. First, we exclude countries for which 
we have no information on different dimensions of financial inclusion index. Second, we discard 
unconsolidated reports of banks whenever consolidated ones of the same group are available to 
offset double counting. Third, we drop banks that had information for fewer than three consecutive 
years, as the bank stability measures computed in this study based on rolling windows over the 
past three years. We deflate all monetary values to 2005 (2005 = 100) prices using the GDP deflator 
of US obtained from the WDI. The deflated series are reported in millions of US dollar ($). The 
variable definitions and the data sources are described in Appendix A. 
3.1. Measuring bank risk 
We follow Laeven and Levine (2009) to measure Zscore which is widely used in the 
literature and considered to be an unbiased and complete indicator of bank riskiness (see, for 
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instance, Houston et al., 2010; Turk Ariss, 2010; Fang et al., 2014). Using assets returns, its 









− =    (1) 
Where ROA  and EQA  are the average return-on-assets and the equity-to-assets ratio, respectively 
and ( )ROAσ  is the standard deviation of return-on-assets. We can interpret this score as the number 
of standard deviation below the mean by which returns would have to drop before all equity in the 
bank gets depleted (Boyd and Runkle, 1993; Beck et al., 2013). If banks’ profitability is normally 
distributed, the inverse proxy of Zscore can be considered as bank’s probability of insolvency. In 
other words, higher returns and capitalisation would increase but volatile returns would decrease 
the stability of banks.  
3.2. Measuring and verifying the strength of the financial inclusion index 
The components used in the construction of financial inclusion are highly correlated with 
each other. To sufficiently capture the common variation among these correlated components of 
financial inclusion as a single measure, we develop an index that represents the overall 
inclusiveness in the financial sector using principal components analysis (henceforth PCA, see 
Online Appendix Section E1 for details on PCA).21 The first principal component from PCA has 
the interpretation of being the single linear combination of the financial inclusion indicators that 
explains most of the variations we see in these indicators. This index will sufficiently deal with 
the problem of multicollinearity and over-parameterisation as a single measure of financial 
inclusion. Before using PCA, indicators of each dimension are normalised to have values of zero 
and one so that the scale in which they are measured is immaterial.22 Since the availability 
dimension is comprised of four variables initially we capture common variation among four 
outreach variables using the PCA and construct availability dimension. Subsequently, we use the 
PCA to extract the common principal component (PC) of the three dimensions that capture 
different aspects of the inclusive financial sector: the penetration, availability and usage of the 
financial services.  
21 Constructing composite index using principal components analysis is well-documented in several papers (see e.g.,  
Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; Bali et al., 2014). 
22 Prior to normalising, we winsorise each indicator at the 95th percentile levels to reduce the influence of outliers at 
the upper tail.  
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Appendix B shows the results of the PCA. Regarding availability dimension, the 
eigenvalues of the four PCs are 2.81, 0.69, 0.45, and 0.05, respectively, suggesting that the first 
principal component explains about 70% of the corresponding sample variance (see Panel A).23 
Except the first PC, none other PCs have eigenvalue greater than one, so we just take first 
component and extract the availability dimension using weights (i.e., 0.52, 0.52, 0.47, and 0.48) 
assigned to first principal component. Regarding financial inclusion, the eigenvalues of the three 
PCs are 1.54, 0.99, and 0.45, respectively, indicating that the first principal component explains 
about 51% of the corresponding sample variance (see Panel B). Similarly, only the first principal 
component has eigenvalue that is more than one so we can assume that the first component 
sufficiently explains the common variation among the three dimensions.24 As shown in equation 
(2), we construct a multidimensional index for financial inclusion using the factor loadings 
(weights) of each dimensions derived from the principal component analysis25: 
 
  0.71*  0.71*  0.06*jt jt jt jtFII Penetration Availability Usage= + +   (2) 
Equation (2) indicates that the financial inclusion index (FII) has somewhat higher 
weights on the penetration and availability dimensions, whereas relatively lower weights on the 
usage dimension.26 In order to facilitate analysis and interpretation, we further normalise this index 
assigned to each country along a 0-1 scale, where zero indicates financial exclusion, and unity 
indicates financial inclusion.27  
Although our paper makes the first systematic attempt to construct a composite index of 
financial inclusion for a longer panel and then analyse its impact on banking stability, it is not 
without its limitations. In the construction of the index, affordability dimension, marketing 
exclusion and self-exclusion have not been addressed. However, despite these shortcomings, we 
23 See Vyas and Kumaranayake (2006). 
24 Since we drop few PCs, it also eliminates a part of the noise components from our data, which ultimately may yield 
more reliable estimates. 
25 Sarma and Pais (2011) measure a weighted index of financial inclusion using manual weights of the dimensions for 
a sample of 49 countries for the calendar year 2004.   
26 In order to check the stability and robustness of our financial inclusion index, we also use principal component 
analysis on a year-by-year basis in which loadings are determined annually instead of over the entire sample period. 
The correlation between these two indices (one where the loadings are derived over the entire sample period and the 
other derived annually) is very high (i.e. 0.98), indicating the robustness of our index irrespective of how loadings are 
determined.  
27 The primary intention of constructing this index is to see the impact of financial inclusion on banking stability. 
Therefore, financial inclusion is measured across countries and period in order to take into account the evolution of 
the index.  
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see this construction of composite index and the associated analysis as a useful and important first 
step towards developing more robust indicator of financial inclusion. In this section, we borrow 
ideas from BDM (2007), and also test the validity of financial inclusion index. First, we use the 
Global Findex survey database, and check the correlation between household-based indicators of 
financial inclusion and the financial inclusion index. In some recent studies (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt 
et al., 2013b; Allen et al., 2014), the most common variables that are used as the indicator of 
financial inclusion are adults with an account at a formal financial institution to total adults (%) 
(i.e., Share of household account) and adults saving at a financial institution in the past year to 
total adults (%) (i.e., Share of household saving). We find that our index is positively and 
significantly correlated at the 1% significance level with these Global Findex indicators. We also 
assess the power of our index to see whether our index is useful in predicting these observable 
micro-level data.  
 
     19.04 (6.81)  92.09 (13.69)*  
     6.59 (3.94)  92.09  (7.65)*  
Share of household account Financial Inclusion
Share of household saving Financial Inclusion
= +
= +
  (3) 
 
We collapse our data at the country level and regress the share of household account (the 
share of household saving) on financial inclusion index using robust standard errors. The 
regression yields R2 of 57% (32%) with 81 observations. T-statistics are reported in the parenthesis 
of equation (3). Financial inclusion index enters significantly at the 1% level, indicating that 
greater financial inclusion is positively associated with the more households having accounts 
(savings) at financial institutions. The correlation between predicted share of household account 
(saving) and the actual share of household account (saving) at financial institution is 76% (56%). 
Second, so far we have seen that our index is powerful enough in predicting household-
based measure of financial access. Now, we use firm-level data taken from the WBES in order to 
gauge the relationship between financial inclusion index and firms’ access to finance, while 
controlling for firm-specific characteristics. WBES contains an expansive array of economic data 
on 130,000 firms in 135 countries over the period 2002-2014.28 We run the following estimations 
at the firm-level:  
28 See Love and Martínez Pería (2014) for details on this database. In addition, out of 87, we could only match 64 
countries’ financial inclusion indices with the WBES database for the period 2004-2012.   
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c,k,t 0 1 , 2 , , , , c t c k t c k tF Financial Inclusion Xβ β β ε= + + +    (4) 
 
Where F is the rating of financing obstacle reported by firm k  in country c  at time t  and X  is a 
set of control variables, which include firm size (employee), a dummy variable for manufacturing 
firms, a dummy for the firms that are involved in exporting, dummy variables for government and 
foreign-owned firms, age of the firms in years, GDP growth rate and regional dummies (see 
Appendix Table A1 for details). We run an ordered probit model to estimate equation (4), as 
financing obstacle is a polychotomous dependent variable with natural order where higher values 
indicate greater financing constraints. It is expected that the greater the financial inclusion the less 
financing constraints there would be for firms to get access to credits. In addition, following Love 
and Martínez Pería (2014), we also use an alternative measure of access to finance. In this case, 
we construct an indicator variable that takes one if firm k  in country c  at time t  has a bank loan, 
line of credit, or overdraft.29 A positive relationship between financial inclusion index and access 
to finance is expected as greater inclusive financial system would alleviate financing constrains 
disbursing more credits to firms.    
The results are reported in Appendix Table C1. The findings confirm the expectation that 
firms tend to report lower (higher) financial constraints (access) in those countries where financial 
inclusion is greater. In particular, we find that financing obstacles are negatively related to 
inclusive financial system, whereas access to finance is positively associated at 1% significant 
level. Therefore, it once again assures the robustness of our index.  
3.3 Measuring bank competition 
Lerner index is used to measure the degree of bank competition. It is considered to be the 
most accurate measure of bank-specific competition than the so-called Panzar-Rosse H-statistics 
or the asset shares of the three largest banks (Carbó-Valverde et al., 2009). The essence of pricing 
power is reflected through Lerner index because it measures the disparity between price and 
marginal cost expressed as a percentage of price. In other words, it captures the degree to which a 
29 Since there is some disparity between the Old (2002-2005) and the New core modules of the surveys, we follow 
BDM (2007) to construct Financing Obstacle, and Love and Martínez-Peria (2014) to construct Access to Finance.  
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bank can increase their marginal price beyond their marginal cost. According to Berger et al. 








=   (5) 
Where itP  is the price of total assets proxied by the ratio of total revenue (interest and non-interest 
income) to total assets for bank i  at time t . itMC  is the marginal cost of producing an additional 
unit of output. The Lerner index is interpreted as inverse of competition; the higher the index 
greater is the pricing power and implies less competitive market conditions. Following 
conventional bank efficiency studies, in this paper we use stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to 
estimate marginal cost and hence Lerner Index. The shortcoming of conventional Lerner index (C-
Lerner) estimated above is that it is measured assuming full bank efficiency and therefore it fails 
to account for the possibilities of bankers’ inability to exploit output pricing opportunities resulting 
from market power. Therefore, we also follow Koetter et al. (2012) to estimate efficiency adjusted 
Lerner index (E-Lerner) (as explained in Online Appendix Section E2). Online Appendix Table 
E1 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables included in the cost and profit functions. 
3.4 Bank-specific and macro control variables 
We control for an array of standard bank-specific characteristics and macroeconomic 
variables. To account for liquidity risk of individual banks, we use ratio of total loans over total 
assets (Fang et al., 2014). We use logarithm of total assets to account for potential size effect on 
banking stability and efficiency, as the too-big-to-fail attitude can destabilize the efficient financial 
intermediation of the entire banking system. The ratio of loan loss provision to total loans is used 
to account for individual bank’s loan portfolio risk. The ambiguous relation of income 
diversification on stability necessitates considering the effect of off-balance sheet activities of 
individual banks. The ratio of total earning assets to total assets is used as better management 
quality that can mitigate excessive risk-taking. Since, well-capitalised banks are assumed to take 
less risk, we use the equity ratio to control for capital risk. In this paper, we also use several 
macroeconomic variables to control for economic development and business cycle of the economy. 
Since, in the last decade, World economies observed substantial volatility, we use GDP to control 
for economic growth. As the economic development generally coincides with an increase in 
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financial inclusion, it is crucial to control for per capita GDP when assessing the association 
between financial inclusion and bank stability. Honohan (2008) argues that it would be interesting 
to see whether the impact financial inclusion remains significant after controlling for per capita 
GDP.  
3.5. Industry growth, external finance dependence, and small firm share 
In our analysis, using cross-country and cross-industry data, we also examine whether 
financial inclusion facilitates industry growth by reducing the costs of external finance to firms. 
Similarly, we further investigate whether industries that are composed of small firms grow faster 
than large-firm industries in economies with higher levels of financial inclusion. Following Rajan 
and Zingales (1998), we calculate the annual (compounded) real growth rate in value added for 36 
industries e.g., three- and four- digit industries of International Standard Industrial Classification 
(ISIC) codes. Industry-level value added data for each country are obtained from the INDSTAT4 
database, which is published by UNIDO in 2010. External finance dependence (EFD) is an 
industry-level index that measures the fraction of desired capital expenditures that cannot be 
financed with internal cash flows for US firms is from Rajan and Zingales (1998). They argue that 
since US financial markets are relatively more open, sophisticated, and developed, US firms 
should encounter fewer obstacles in achieving desired level of financial structure than firms 
operating in other countries (Houston et al., 2010). Using industry-level data and including an 
interaction between an industry-level characteristic (i.e., EFD) and a country-level characteristic 
(i.e., financial inclusion) would provide a valid and exogenous way to identify the extent of an 
industry’s external dependence anywhere in the world (Kroszner et al., 2007). We expect that the 
impact of financial inclusion on industry growth would be stronger in the sectors that rely more 
on external finance.  
Since inclusive financial systems would reduce more financing obstacles of a small firm 
than a large firm, we also investigate whether financial inclusion boosts the growth of the small-
firm industries more than the large-firm industries. Small firm shares are industry-level index that 
measure the industry’s share of employment by US firms with less than N  employees (N is either 
5 or 10 or 20) using data from the US Census on all US firms for the year 1997 from Beck et al. 
(2008). They argue that technological share of small firms of US industries can serve as the 
appropriate benchmark for the same industries of other countries because the relatively frictionless 
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US financial markets should yield few policies distorting firm size. Since our industry growth 
regression depends on the availability of the financial inclusion data, our final matched sample 
includes 672 observations in 25 countries. The average growth rate in real value added in our 
sample is 4%. The external finance dependence, small firm shares (<5 employees, <10 employees, 
and <20 employees) are 3.4%, 1%, 3%, and 6%, respectively.  
3.6. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study. The mean 
value of Z-score is 3.7 with a standard deviation of 1.3, implying that on average return on assets 
would have to fall by 3.7 times their standard deviation to wipe out bank equity. The fairly high 
standard deviation suggests that there is considerable cross-country variation in the level of bank 
stability. The mean negative logarithm of return volatility is 6.1. For the variable of interest, the 
mean of the financial inclusion index is 0.57, where penetration, availability and usage dimensions 
are 0.51, 0.62, and 0.12, respectively. The standard deviation of 0.30 indicates considerable 
heterogeneity in the inclusiveness of financial systems across our broad sample of 87 countries.  
Table 2 reports the countries in our sample, ranked according to our index of financial 
inclusion. In terms of financial inclusion, South Korea (0.99), Belgium (0.98) and Japan (0.98) 
have the highest inclusive banking system, whereas Afghanistan (0.01), Yemen (0.02) and Malawi 
(0.03) have the lowest (also see Figure E1 in the Online Appendix). On average, European 
countries have the highest financial inclusion (0.53) and banking stability (72.4), whereas African 
countries have the lowest value of 0.11 and 53.3, respectively. The average financial inclusion and 
banking stability of Asian and American countries are almost identical. The disparity of individual 
constituent contributing to the index of financial inclusion is also staggering. For example:  United 
Kingdom ranks 29 in financial inclusion index but it ranks 76 in penetration and 9 in availability 
dimension. Therefore, using individual dimension as a proxy for financial inclusion would provide 
incomprehensive picture of a country’s overall inclusiveness. The correlation matrix of the 
independent variables used in this paper is reported in the Online Appendix Table E2. The positive 
correlation between institutional quality indexes and financial inclusion in Panel B is an additional 
indication of the robustness of the index measured in this study. With the strong positive 
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correlation between per capita GDP and financial inclusion further proves robustness of our index 
(see Honohan, 2008).30  
4. Methodology 
We examine the impact of financial inclusion on banking stability using bank-level data 
from 87 countries. It is possible that the results of the study may be biased because of endogeneity 
problem between financial inclusion and bank stability. Endogeneity can arise if bank engages in 
risky activities in the current set-up and venture into rural areas to offset high risk and/or if they 
self-select into inclusive financial activities because these reward them with greater market power 
and profitability. Therefore, we use instrumental variable technique with a two-step generalized 
method of moments (GMM) estimator using heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent 
(HAC) variance estimation of Newey and West (1987).31 This estimator extracts the exogenous 
component of financial inclusion, reducing concerns about endogeneity. We run several 
regressions using the following baseline model: 
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Where the i, j and t subscripts indicate bank, country and year, respectively. Bank stability is 
log(Zscore), measured at the bank level. We control for various bank- and country-specific 
characteristics. Our main explanatory variable of interest is financial inclusion index, measured at 
the country level. To control for time invariant bank heterogeneity and time varying global 
business cycle effects, we include bank fixed effects iα  and year fixed effects tYear , respectively. 
As a robustness test, we use standard deviation of return-on-assets (ROA). Since expanding access 
of the low yield clienteles to basic financial services may have negative impact on the bottom line 
of banks, it is natural to check robustness of our results using income volatility of individual banks 
30 Since financial inclusion is generally related to per capita income, these two variables tend to be correlated. We 
computed the variance inflation factors (VIF) for each of our model estimates. VIF is equal to 1/ (1-r2), where r2 is 
from the regression of an independent variable on rest of the independent variables. The average VIF never exceeds 
3, indicating that multicollinearity is not a cause of concern for our results (Anginer et al., 2014). Furthermore, 
following previous studies on the determinants of financial development (e.g., La Porta et al., 1997; Beck et al., 2003), 
as a robustness test we exclude per capita GDP in all estimations and the results are broadly consistent with the main 
findings of this study. The results are available from the authors upon request.   
31 Since GMM accounts for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation it is more efficient than 2SLS (Hall, 2005).  
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as an alternative measure of banking stability. Furthermore, considering the recent development 
in the measures of bank competition, we employ both conventional and efficiency adjusted Lerner 
indices as the measures of Bank Competition, which should also serve the purpose of robustness 
of our results.32   
5. Empirical results 
First, we report the specification tests and results for financial inclusion and stability 
based on the IV regression model in equation (6). Second, we report the contingent effects of 
financial inclusion with bank competition on banking stability.  
5.1. Financial inclusion and bank stability 
In this section, we examine how financial inclusion affects bank stability after controlling 
for bank and country level variables. Results are reported in Table 3, where we use two different 
measures of bank stability. In column 1-2 and 3-4, we regress log(Zscore) and –log(sd(ROA)) on 
financial inclusion, respectively.  For the latter case, we follow Beck et al. (2013), and transform 
return volatility to make it directly proportional to banking stability. To check for the robustness 
of our results, we use two variant measures of market power denoted as C-Lerner and E-Lerner. 
Before choosing which estimator we should use for equation (6), we conduct endogeneity test for 
the financial inclusion measures, which is reported at the bottom of the Table. For rejecting the 
null hypothesis of exogeneity, we employ the IV-GMM estimator. In case we cannot reject the 
exogeneity of financial inclusion, we use the OLS estimator as it is more efficient. In both cases, 
we calculate heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors which are 
reported in the square brackets. We test the validity of our instrumental variables as in GMM 
procedures using the under-identification LM test by Kleibergen and Paap (2006) and the over-
identification test by Hansen (1982). The results on these tests show that the instruments used are 
valid as the p-value of the former (latter) requires a value lower (higher) than 0.05 to reject the null 
hypothesis at the 5% level.  
32 We use lagged values of Lerner indices to mitigate any remaining endogeneity issues that may be associated with 
market power and stability (see e.g., Turk Ariss, 2010; Love and Martínez Pería, 2014). 
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Online Appendix Table E3 shows the First-stage regressions of financial inclusion on 
instruments used in this study.33 We find that all instruments have statistically significant effects 
on financial inclusion- the direct effect and interaction. Moreover, the signs and magnitudes of the 
coefficients are economically important, as financial inclusion increases more in markets with 
greater financial freedom and higher density of newly registered companies. A system with higher 
financial freedom and entry density would facilitate access to finance through augmenting banking 
competition and creates a milieu for efficient financial intermediation between households, 
financial institutions, firms and entrepreneurs.34 For example: to assess economic significance of 
whole set of instruments, consider column 4, at the mean for entry density (2.61), the marginal 
effect of financial freedom equals 0.002 (0.002-0.0001*2.61 = 0.002). This effect implies that one 
standard deviation above average increase in financial freedom (70.83) leads to 0.14 units increase 
in financial inclusion (equals little less than ½ standard deviation of financial inclusion).  
It is clear from the results that more inclusive financial system is associated with greater 
banking stability, as indicated by its positive and significant (at the 1% level) coefficients (once 
again, a greater estimated Zscore indicates more stability i.e., less risk taking). Given the mean of 
log(Zscore) is 3.71, the effect is not only statistically significant but also economically significant. 
Since we use the natural logarithm of Zscore, the coefficients can be interpreted as semi-elasticity. 
In column 1, a one standard deviation increase in the index of financial inclusion, which equals 
0.30, is associated with an increase in the log(Zscore) of 189% (6.3*0.30). Put differently, our 
financial inclusion index lies between zero and unity, where one standard deviation increase would 
be a substantial increase for any given economy, for a ¼ standard deviation increase in the index 
of financial inclusion leads to 45% (6.4*0.07) increases in the bank stability (based on averaging 
the results across column 1 and 2). The effect is economically important as it suggests that financial 
inclusion enhances banks to have secure deposit base as well as wider lending opportunities. In 
particular, inclusive financial sector alleviates financing constraints of SMEs and also mitigate the 
post-lending moral hazard problems. Therefore, with inclusive financial sector, banks enjoy 
greater financial stability. To illustrate the effect, we compare the improvement in the banking 
33 The significant negative relationship between market power and financial inclusion in Table A3 is consistent with 
the existing literature and should serve as another indication of the robustness of our index (see for example Carbó-
Valverde et al., 2009; Ryan et al., 2014). 
34 Entry density is one of the channels through which financial development fosters economic growths (Klapper et al., 
2006). 
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stability of two countries with different levels of financial inclusion (i.e., at the 25th and 50th of the 
index). Take the example of column 1. The estimation suggests that banks in Trinidad and Tobago 
(25th Percentiles; ranks 40 in our sample) would be 112% more stable if it has the financial 
inclusion of Chile (50th Percentiles; ranks 10 in our sample). This result also corroborates with the 
additional risk measures used in this study. The negative of return volatility –log(sd(ROA)), in 
columns 3 and 4, is also positively related to financial inclusion, suggesting that an increase in the 
index of financial inclusion is associated with reduction in return volatility.  
These results are consistent with the view that a system with inclusive financial services 
tend to reinforce banking stability (e.g., Han and Melecky, 2013; Khan, 2011; Morgan and 
Pontines, 2014) and that higher degree of financial inclusion mitigates excessive risk-taking of 
individual bank. Since greater financial inclusion reduces distance between financial institutions 
and low-end customers it is able to decrease the probability of loan defaults, and hence bank 
fragility. This result is also supported by Agarwal and Hauswald (2007) and DeYoung et al. (2008), 
who use US data and find that loan default probability increases with the distance between lender 
and borrowers. Recent empirical evidence also finds positive impact of geographic diversification 
and reducing distance between banks and borrowers (e.g., Berger and DeYoung, 2001; Bos and 
Kolari, 2005; Deng and Elyasiani, 2008; Rossi et al., 2009). Since banks operate in more inclusive 
banking sectors are able to reduce income volatility and increase soundness, we therefore argue 
that financial inclusion is good for bank stability. 
 Our results on control variables are also consistent with existing literature. As might be 
expected, larger banks, and banks with better management, higher equity capital and pricing power 
are more stable. Regarding country-level macro controls, banks engage in less risk-taking if the 
economic growth is high. However, they indulge in more risk-taking when they operate in 
countries where the levels of economic development is high.  
5.2. The interactive effect of bank competition and financial inclusion 
We have shown in the previous section that financial inclusion is good for banking 
stability consistent with the notion that inclusive financial sector mitigates excessive risk taking of 
banks. Since the impact of lack of access to finance may rely on the competitiveness in the markets, 
and bank competition being one of the important determinants through which banking soundness 
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gets affected, it is imperative to investigate how the relationship between financial inclusion and 
bank stability changes due to competitiveness in the markets.35  
Recent studies show that bank competition is instrumental in broadening financial access 
(e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Beck et al., 2004; Carbó-Valverde et al., 2009; Chong et al., 2013; 
Love and Martínez Pería, 2014; Ryan et al., 2014).36 The literature is divided into two streams. 
The information hypothesis argues that greater market power may persuade banks to establish 
relationship lending and internalise benefits of supporting informationally opaque or risky 
customers, and hence lead to more credit availability (Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Di Patti and 
Dell'Ariccia, 2004). In addition, when banks enter into a new market to facilitate access to finance, 
in a competitive environment, they tend to earn lower informational rents from their relationship 
with borrowers, decreasing incentives to monitor borrowers, which in turn lead to banking fragility 
(see e.g., Boot and Thakor, 1993; Allen and Gale, 2004). Recent theoretical models show that 
fiercer competition not only induces banks to acquire less information on borrowers (Dell'Ariccia 
and Marquez, 2004) but also persuade them towards more risky and opaque customers (Hauswald 
and Marquez, 2006). Therefore, if there is more interbank competition in an unbanked area, banks 
should have a portfolio of risky borrowers, again undermining their stability.  
On the other hand, based on the traditional industrial organisation theory, the market 
power hypothesis argues that higher competition results in more loan supply ensuring lower 
lending rates, thereby improving credit availability (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2004; 
Carbó-Valverde, Rodriguez-Fernandez and Udell, 2009; Ryan, O’Toole and McCann, 2014). 
When bank enters into a new market with high market power they may charge higher interest rate 
on loans which may incentivise households and small firms to search for higher returns and make 
risky investments, increasing probability of default, and hence losses of the banks. Again, it may 
be the case that fewer large banks with high market power in a banking system often enjoys “too-
big-to-fail” subsidies from safety net policies it may induce them to take excessive risk and 
35 Numerous studies investigate the relationship between bank competition and stability with little consensus about 
the unambiguous direction of the relationship. Literature argues about two offsetting effect of bank competition on 
stability. On one hand, the traditional competition-fragility hypothesis argues that greater competition increases 
banking fragility as it induces excessive risk-taking due to reduced profit margins (Keeley, 1990; Hellmann et al., 
2000). On the other hand, competition-stability hypothesis argues that greater competition increases banking stability 
because it facilitates low interest rates for smoother repayment of loans, and decreases default risk of borrowers and 
thereby bank loses (Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005). However, we do not test the validity of either of these hypotheses, 
rather we investigate the relative importance of bank competition on the financial inclusion-stability relation. See Beck 
et al. (2013) for detailed discussion on bank competition and stability. 
36 See DBH (2008). 
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destabilise the entire financial system (cf. Anginer et al., 2014, and references therein). Regarding 
financial inclusion, this situation may get worse when large banks pursuing inclusive banking 
agenda without adhering to proper screening and monitoring procedures while serving low-end 
customers who often lack collateral and credit histories, increasing banking fragility. Therefore, in 
this section, we introduce an interaction term between financial inclusion and bank competition in 
the equation (6), and examine whether competition reduces or reinforces the positive relationship 
between financial inclusion and bank stability.  
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In equation (7), all other variables remain unchanged as in equation (6) except the 
interaction term, where we are interested in the coefficient 9β . The results of the interaction 
between financial inclusion and bank competition are reported in Table 4. Consistent with the 
earlier regressions, we also use IV estimator where both financial inclusion and interactive terms 
(i.e., financial inclusion and Lerner indices) are treated as endogenous variables, and instrumented 
via analogous instruments as in Table 3. For column 1 of Table 4, we find significant positive 
interactive effect on banking stability. The positive coefficient suggests that the complementary 
effect of financial inclusion on bank stability is more pronounced in less competitive markets. 
Using the coefficients estimated in column 2, our result suggests that for a banking system with 
average market power (0.12), the marginal effect of financial inclusion is 6.6, whereas for a 
banking sector with market power of one standard deviation above average (0.36), the impact 
reaches to 6.9. Translating these into changes in the banking stability, we find that a banking sector 
with average market power, ¼ standard deviation increase in the financial inclusion (0.07) results 
in an approximately 46% increase in the banking stability, whereas it is 48% if market power 
increases by one standard deviation above average. This finding is corroborated by the significant 
positive coefficients of the interaction terms in column 3 and 4. The evidence suggests that the 
magnitude of the positive impact of financial inclusion on banking stability increases if banks have 
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higher market power. In other words, financial inclusion has significant positive impact on banking 
stability but greater competition affects this relation adversely.  
This result is not only significant statistically but also economically important as greater 
financial inclusion may limit the extent to which banks can or will engage in correlated risk taking 
activities in absence of competition because they are able to venture into new markets, or seek new 
lines of business or clients. By dint of higher financial inclusion, banks have ample opportunities 
to lend many small loans, for which losses are negligible and predictable (see Adasme et al., 2006), 
indicating imperfect correlation of loan defaults. Recently, Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) 
show that at a lower correlation of loan defaults, greater bank competition is detrimental to bank 
stability, supporting our result of positive coefficient on interaction term. Petersen and Rajan 
(1995) and Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) show that “relationship banking” and/or “borrower 
proximity” is the efficient method through which banks can collect soft information to reduce 
asymmetric information. As financial inclusion reduces distance and informational asymmetry, 
banks with market power can provide finances to less creditworthy households/firms and monitor 
carefully to reduce loan default rates, and thus enhance banking stability. 
   
5.3. Institutional quality and financial inclusion 
The impact of greater financial inclusion may depend on the larger institutional 
environment in which bank operates, and can potentially be fortified through better institutional 
quality. For example, freedom of expression, political stability, regulatory quality and rule of law 
may limit the extent to which banks can engage in correlated risk taking activities where the 
financial inclusion is lower. In this section, we examine how the interaction between financial 
inclusion and each country’s institutional environment affect the positive role of financial 
inclusion on banking stability as follows.  
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In equation (8), we add six indicators of institutional quality taken from Kaufmann et al. 
(2010) Governance Index. As these indicators are highly correlated, we run regression using each 
indicator and its interaction term with financial inclusion one at a time to avoid multicollinearity 
problem. However, we capture common variation among these six governance indicators using 
the principal component analysis and construct a composite index of institutional quality (IQI). 
For sake of simplicity, we use logarithm of Zscore as the dependent variable keeping all other bank 
and macro controls analogous.37 The financial inclusion and the interaction term are treated as 
endogenous and instrumented via variables that are reported at the bottom of the Table 5 with main 
results. For expositional brevity, and because we are interested in the interaction effects, the results 
of the controls are not reported.  
Most of the interaction terms enter positively and significantly at 5% level. Column 1, 2, 
4, and 5 of Table 5 suggest that the benefit of having greater freedom of expressions and free media 
(Voice), political stability (Political), regulatory quality (Regulatory), and rule of law (Law) in 
reducing bank risk-taking is more pronounced in the markets where financial inclusion is higher. 
At the bottom of the table, we report marginal effect of financial inclusion at the mean of each 
indicator. Column 6 shows that at the mean value of control of corruption greater financial 
inclusion reduces banking fragility. In column 7, we use the first principal component (the only 
component that has eigenvalue more than one i.e., 5.27 with 87% variation) of all institutional 
variables (e.g., Voice, Political, Government, Regulatory, Law and Corruption) and created a 
composite index of ‘Institutional Quality’ and run regression. The interaction term in column 7 
also confirms our results that the positive impact of institutional quality on reducing risk is higher 
if banks operate in an inclusive financial system.   
In terms of the economic significance, the magnitude of the coefficient suggests that there 
is significant effect of financial inclusion on banking stability in the countries with highest levels 
of institutional development. For instance, using estimated coefficients in column 7, the derivative 
(partial) of bank stability with respect to financial inclusion at the mean level of our composite 
institutional quality index (IQI) is 10.88 (significant at 1% level). The same derivative evaluated 
at the 25th percentiles (lower) of IQI is 6.24 (significant at 1% level). On the other hand, when the 
IQI is at 75th percentile (higher), it increases by more than two factors (15.22) (significant at 1% 
level). These findings are consistent with existing empirical literature as Beck et al. (2005) show 
37 In all these regressions, we use efficiency adjusted Lerner indices as the proxy of bank competition. 
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that greater institutional development (e.g., financial, legal and corruption) facilitates better access 
to finance especially for the smallest firms. For example: more effective rule of law provides more 
flexibility in terms of contract enforcement without much delay. Overall, the positive interactive 
effects seem to suggest that the beneficial effects of financial inclusion on banking stability 
reinforces if the market within which banks operate have greater quality of institutional settings.38 
5.4. Additional sensitivity analysis 
 In this section, we discuss various additional robustness tests of our study. In each 
specification, we conduct endogeneity test. In case it is not statistically significant at 5% level, we 
use ordinary least square regression as it is more efficient. The definitions of rest of the variables 
are same as in equation (6). At the bottom of each table, we report the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) 
test for weak instruments and the Hansen over-identification test. 
5.4.1. Alternative financial inclusion index 
Although we construct financial inclusion index incorporating as many dimension as 
possible given the data availability constraints it is possible that our results are inferred incorrectly 
because of poorly constructed index. Therefore, we use alternative financial inclusion index that 
is taken from the Global Findex Database, which collects information how people in 148 countries 
manage their financial activities. The variable we use as the financial inclusion proxy is the 
percentage of adults that had savings at a financial institution in the year prior to the survey (see 
e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2013b; Allen et al., 2014). This database is new and just covers the 
year 2011. We had to collapse our dataset at bank-level to run two-stage cross-sectional 
instrumental variable regressions.  Global Findex and its interaction with Lerner indices are treated 
as endogenous variables. These variables are instrumented via the financial freedom, entry density 
and their interactions. The regression results are presented in Table 6, showing that the relationship 
between Global Findex and bank stability is still positive and statistically significant. Regarding 
the interactive effect, it also corroborates with the earlier finding that the positive impact of 
38 Interestingly, we find that the derivative of log(Zscore) with respect to financial inclusion at the minimum level of 
institutional quality (i.e., -6.30) is -3.89, whereas the  derivative of log(Zscore) with respect to institutional quality at 
the minimum level of financial inclusion (i.e., 0.008) is  -0.59, suggesting institutional quality has greater impact on 
banking stability than financial inclusion (see Baltagi et al., 2009, p295). 
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financial inclusion on bank stability is robust in less competitive markets. It reiterates that financial 
inclusion is good for banking stability.  
5.4.2. Using disaggregated dimensions of financial inclusion index 
The results reported in Tables 3-7 indicate that there is a strong link between financial 
inclusion index and banking stability. In this section, we disaggregate financial inclusion index 
into its components (i.e., Accessibility, Availability, and Usage dimensions), to further explore 
whether individual dimension of financial inclusion has a particular important influence on bank 
stability. Table 7 reports the results of the regressions in which dependent variables are analogous 
as in Table 3. We use the same control variables, but now we separately explore the impacts of 
three dimensions of the financial inclusion index.39 The results indicate that each of the dimensions 
has a positive effect on bank stability. Among the three dimensions, the absolute value of the 
estimated coefficient is largest for the accessibility dimension (i.e., the number of deposit and loan 
accounts per 1,000 adults), and smallest for the usage dimension (i.e., total volume of deposit and 
loans relative to GDP). All of these dimensions are significant at the 1% level, which confirms that 
individual dimensions of financial inclusion index also has similar effect on bank stability. It also 
reiterates about the appropriateness of using these dimensions in the construction of financial 
inclusion index.  
 
5.4.3. Alternative banking stability measure  
Following Beck et al. (2013), we use alternative measure of bank stability in which the 
denominator in equation (1) is calculated using five years rolling windows. As usual, financial 
inclusion is instrumented via the financial freedom, entry density and their interactions. The results 
are reported in Table 8. The main results remain unaltered with a slight increase in the magnitude 
of the coefficients.   
 
 
39 For brevity, we only use efficiency-adjusted Lerner index as the measure of bank competition. 
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5.4.4. Split samples based on financial inclusion 
We split our sample into terciles according to the financial inclusion index and re-run six 
regressions.40 The results are reported in Table 9 (column 1-6). The low, medium and high terciles 
of financial inclusion are instrumented via the investment freedom (ranges 0-100, higher value 
implies less constraints on the flow of investment capital) entry density and investment freedom 
times entry density (the result of the first-stage regression is available from the authors). The result 
indicates that the effect of financial inclusion at the lower terciles is negative with banking stability. 
It becomes significant at the medium terciles. We can see that the magnitude of the coefficient of 
the highest terciles is twofold higher than medium terciles. This is consistent with our argument 
that greater inclusive banking sector is good for soundness of banks. 
 
5.4.5. Different sample selection 
We also conduct a battery of sensitivity checks using different sample selection criteria 
such as excluding cooperative and Islamic banks, excluding Japan and Italy, and finally excluding 
developed countries. Our dataset comprises 1549 commercial banks, 1084 cooperative banks and 
37 Islamic banks. We drop all cooperative and Islamic banks from our dataset and keep only 
commercial banks. The result of the regressions, which is reported in Table 9 (column 7 and 8), 
shows that the magnitude of the positive effects of financial inclusion on banking stability is even 
higher in the case of only commercial banks, reiterating beneficial effect of financial inclusion on 
soundness of banks. The number of banks in Japan and Italy is 457 and 489, respectively which 
constitute the lion’s share of our sample. We drop these two countries and re-run regressions, 
which are reported in Table 9 (column 9 and 10). Dropping Japan and Italy does not alter the main 
findings of this study. Finally, we also drop all banks of the developed countries keeping only 708 
banks that operate in developing countries, and re-run regressions. The result also corroborates the 
earlier findings that financial inclusion is good for banking stability. 
 
40 The summary statistics of the group with the lowest financial inclusion index has an average (median) bank stability 
(Z-score) of 70.2 (34.3), the group with the medium financial inclusion index has an average (median) bank stability 
of 94.8 (45.9), and the group with the highest financial inclusion index has an average (median) bank stability of 138.8 
(56.1). 
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6. Financial inclusion, external finance dependence, small firm share, and economic growth 
So far, the results reported in Section 5 clearly indicate that financial inclusion is good 
for bank stability. While these findings are important for public policy-making, a natural question 
arises whether greater banking stability is good or bad for the growth of the sectors that rely more 
on external finance as well as of the sectors that have larger share of small firms. Though answering 
these questions and finding the optimal level of banking stability across countries is well beyond 
the scope of this paper, we shed some light on the consequence of greater bank stability. Banks 
with greater stability may broaden financial services to underbanked sectors of the economy: 
sectors that rely more on external finance, and that are naturally composed of small firms for 
technological reasons. If market frictions–e.g., transaction costs and informational opacity–hinder 
small firms and firms that are heavy users of external finance to get access to credit, higher levels 
of financial inclusion will ameliorate these frictions and will aid in the faster growth of firms, 
which in turn leads to higher economic growth.  
Following the seminal work by Rajan and Zingales (1998), in this section, we therefore 
investigate whether the sectors which depend more on external finance have higher growth in the 
countries with higher levels of financial inclusion. In addition, we also test whether inclusive 
financial systems exert a disproportionately positive effect on the growth of industries that are 
traditionally composed of small firms. With this point in mind, we adopt a methodology that is 
extensively used in the recent literature (e.g., Cetorelli and Gambera, 2001; Kroszner et al., 2007; 
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where ,i kGrowth  is the annual (compounded) growth rate in real value added for 2000-2010 for 
industry i  in country k . In addition to the industry and country dummies, following previous 
studies (e.g., Kroszner et al., 2007; Houston et al., 2010) more country characteristics are included 
such as bank competition, the levels of economic development, efficiency of a country’s legal 
system, property rights, credit information depth, and institutional quality index. , i kIndustry share  
is the industry 'i s share of total value added in manufacturing in 2000 in country k.  
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The focus of our analysis is on the interaction between   Financial inclusion index  and 
IES .41 IES  is a vector of two variables such as   iExternal finance dependence  and 
  iSmall firm share . First,   iExternal finance dependence  is a measure of the industry 'i s  
dependence on external finance is based on the US firms from Rajan and Zingales (1998). Second, 
  iSmall firm share is the industry 'i s  share of employment by firms with less than N employees (N 
is either 5 or 10 or 20) is based on the US firms in 1997 from Beck et al. (2008). ,i kε  is the error 
term.  If η  is positive and significant, this suggests inclusive financial system exerting a 
disproportionately positive effect on industries that rely more on external finance (or on small firm 
industries).  
The results of the OLS regressions are reported in columns 1-4 in Table 10. Though the 
adopted methodology reduces potential endogeneity problems, we explore the robustness of our 
results using an instrumental variable approach in column 5-8. Looking at column 1, we find that 
industries that are heavy users of external finance grow faster in economies with inclusive financial 
systems, as indicated by the positive and significant interaction between Financial inclusion index 
and External finance dependence. In columns 2-4, the interactions of Financial inclusion index 
and Small firm share (< 5 or 10 or 20 employees) enter positively and significantly at the 5% level. 
It suggests that small firm industries–i.e., industries with larger shares of  small firms–grow faster 
in economies with higher levels of financial inclusion, and the magnitude of this effect is relatively 
stronger in the industries that have relatively smaller share of employment of firms. All these 
results are in line with previous studies (e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Beck et al., 2008).   
 
7. Enabling inclusive financial environment: difference-in-differences approach 
In this section, we exploit the exogenous variation of developing counties’ membership 
timing into a global network of policymakers with inclusive finance agenda, and evaluate the 
effects of enabling inclusive financial environment on banking stability by using both parametric 
(difference-in-differences) and non-parametric matching estimators while employing bank- and 
country-level data.  
41 We do not include financial inclusion index on its own, since we focus on within-country, within-industry growth 
rates (see e.g., Kroszner et al., 2007; Beck et al., 2008).  
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In the aftermath of the global financial crisis that took place in 2008, the leaders of the 
Group of Twenty (G20) recognised the mutually reinforcing policy objectives of financial 
inclusion, stability and consumer protection.42 They committed to increase access of the 
disadvantaged groups to financial services through principles for innovative financial inclusion at 
the Pittsburgh Summit in 2009. These principles were drafted by three Financial Inclusion Experts 
Group namely the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation), the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), and the World Bank Group’s 
private financing arm, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) (Soederberg, 2013). Among 
these expert groups, AFI is founded in 2008 and known as the first global knowledge sharing 
network for policymakers on financial inclusion. At present, AFI’s network is composed of central 
banks and other financial institutions from more than 90 countries. In 2011, to complement G20 
principles, the Maya Declaration was signed by a group of developing country regulatory 
institutions at the third Global Policy Forum of the AFI held in Mexico to strengthen and expand 
financial inclusion policy (see Online Appendix Table E4 for detail on the G20 principles and 
Maya Declaration commitments). However, we find 30 out of 87 countries in our sample that 
become member of the AFI network after the first Global Policy Forum of AFI held in Nairobi in 
2009. Since they become member of this network, they could share knowledge on financial 
inclusion as well as develop and implement policies designed to expand access of the poor people 
to financial services. Since then, broadening financial inclusion has become an important policy 
objective for these member countries and has set the stage for many enabling laws and regulations 
to support the poor.43  
42 http://www.afi-global.org/sites/default/files/afi%20g20%20principles.pdf 
43 The list of supporting laws and regulations that have been taken by developing countries to broaden financial 
inclusion are exhaustive and not limited to the following selective instances. For example: In 2009, Pakistan created 
consultative group on branchless banking and launched risk sharing facility for small and rural enterprises; Fiji 
established national taskforce on financial inclusion and agreed on medium-term financial inclusion strategy to reach 
150,000 unbanked. In 2010, Bangladesh established microcredit regulatory authority regulations; Ethiopia developed 
growth and transformation plan that includes a national financial inclusion strategy; and Morocco implemented 
financial inclusion strategy. In 2011, El Salvador passed a law appointing the Central Bank the head of public policies 
on the financial system, including financial inclusion; Mexico created the National Council for Financial Inclusion 
(CONAIF) through Presidential Decree; Democratic Republic of Congo launched mobile banking services. In 2012, 
Bangladesh began licensing mobile banking; Brazil launched action plan for the national partnership for financial 
inclusion; Colombia undertook massive expansion of mobile financial services and expanded the number of banking 
agents; India, issued policy guidelines for expanding the banking network to unbanked customers. For more please 
visit AFI’s website. 
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Since the banks of these member countries are exposed to various financial access 
policies, we assume that the changing inclusive financial environment will have discernible effect 
on the risk-taking of the banks. Therefore, using bank— and country—level data, we investigate 
whether the financial access policies have any effect on banking stability applying a difference-in-
differences approach as followings:  
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where i  indexes bank, j  indexes countries, and t  indexes years.  ijtBank stability  is the financial 
stability of banks as defined earlier. The country and year fixed effects are denoted as jα  and tα , 
respectively (we also use bank fixed effects as a robustness test in Table 11). The analogous bank-
and country-specific controls are used as in equation (6). Lagged values of efficiency adjusted 
Lerner indices are used as the proxy for bank competition in order to eliminate any endogeneity 
issue. Pro-financial Access Policyjt-1 is an indicator variable that takes a value equal to one if the 
bank is in a country that became a member of AFI’s network in 2009 and thereafter or else zero 
(see Table D1 for membership timing across countries). In this case, our variable of interest is γ . 
If exposure to AFI’s network is congenial to broadening financial inclusion, then the estimated 
coefficient of banking stability will show a positive outcome. This coefficient captures the 
sensitivity of the dependent variable to the changes in financial inclusion between a group of 
countries that is exposed to a treatment (henceforth treated) and a group that is not exposed to the 
treatment (henceforth control) after becoming member of the AFI network.44 Since we are 
controlling both groups before and after the events and same group is acting as control and treated 
in this methodology we are able to control for both observables and unobservable factors that may 
have changed over time as well. By so doing, we are able to eliminate any bias that emanates from 
changes other than the Pro-financial access policies that could have affected the treated group 
(Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). Similar type of regression is used by Jayaratne and Strahan 
(1996) and Koetter et al. (2012) on cross-state setup for US banking sector, Haselmann et al. (2010) 
on cross-country setup for East European countries. 
44 For details on this methodology see Haselmann et al. (2010). 
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For the DID approach to be meaningful, there are two aspects that should be taken into 
consideration. First, the changes in the efforts of broadening financial inclusion need to be 
exogenous and second, comparison groups should be homogeneous. The first issue whether 
changes in the efforts of financial inclusion are exogenous or endogenous has little effect on our 
DID result as most of the policy suggestions were encouraged by various multilateral organisations 
(e.g., G20, AFI and World Bank). This shows the exogenous nature and randomness in embracing 
innovative access policy initiatives. In addition, endogeneity is less of a concern for our analysis 
as we investigate the impact of a country-level indicator on bank-level stability. We are mostly 
concerned about the second issue of getting a comparison group that should serve as a valid 
counterfactual. To eradicate selection bias and confounding factors, in the spirit of Ho et al. (2007), 
we use propensity score matching, developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) to get a matched 
comparison group and then run difference-in-differences regression on the matched sample. This 
doubly robust technique provides unbiased estimates of the treatment effects even if either or both 
of the procedures are correctly specified and could be considered of the exposure similar to that 
from a randomised trial (Funk et al., 2011). This approach also allows us to estimate the treatment 
effects while controlling for both observed and unobserved bank- and country-specific 
characteristics. First, we adopt a nearest-neighbor logit propensity score matching strategy to 
identify non-member countries of AFI which are similar to the member countries on the basis of 
observable characteristics.45 Second, each member country of AFI is matched with non-member 
country that has the closest propensity score within a given caliper (i.e., threshold). Third, 
regressions are run on the matched sample using difference-in-differences approach.  
Panel A of Table 11 reports the results of DID estimation on a matched sample. In all 
specifications, year dummies are included to control for the business cycle. Standard errors are 
clustered at the country-level as omitted country characteristics might cause error terms to be 
correlated for banks within the same country. While we control for country fixed effects in column 
1-4, we consider bank fixed effects in column 5-8. The result shows that financial stability of the 
banks that operate in the treated countries has increased substantially following the changes in 
financial access policies. As can be seen from column 1 and 3 that the indicator Pro-financial 
45 Observable characteristics are the industry average total asset, GDP per capita, GDP growth rate, financial freedom, 
and regulatory quality. Balancing tests are satisfied and reported along with the Logit model in the Online Appendix 
Table E5. 
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Access Policy is positive and significantly related with banking stability, to reduce the residual 
variance while increasing efficiency of the DID results, we use the analogous controls as in 
equation (6) in columns 2 and 4. The outcomes are robust even after controlling for bank- and 
country-specific control variables. The economic impact of the financial access policies on 
banking stability is considerable. The increasing efforts of having inclusive financial system have 
improved the soundness of the banks that operate in the treated countries by 36%.46 The results 
also corroborate when we control for unobserved bank-specific characteristics in column 5-8.   
To further alleviate any potential selection bias and confounding in the treatment effects, 
that might yet remain in the DID results, we use two other matching techniques (i.e., kernel and 
stratification) and recently developed covariate matching estimator of Abadie and Imbens (2006) 
to estimate the average treatment effect for the treated (ATT).47 For the latter case, ATT is 
estimated matching on four nearest neighbours (Abadie et al., 2004). The advantage of this 
approach is that it employs covariates to match treatment group and control group.48 It also corrects 
for bias if matching is imperfect, and calculates heteroskedasticity robust standard errors of the 
treatment effects without making any assumption about the functional form. 
 Panel B of Table 11 reports the results of the matching estimators. In all matching 
estimators, we impose common support condition to restrict control groups to fall within the 
support of the propensity score distribution of the treated groups. The result corresponds to the 
earlier findings that after changes in the efforts of having inclusive financial system the stability 
of the banks that operate in the treated countries increases by 42% (averaging across all matching 
estimators). The results once again reiterate that inclusive financial sector has causal effect on the 
soundness of banks. The result is also consistent with the economic rationale that greater 
institutional pursuit to financial inclusiveness helps reducing the informational asymmetry 
between borrowers and lenders. 
We subject our findings to a series of additional sensitivity checks. The results are robust 
to (i) using an alternative measure of financial inclusion that is taken from Global Findex database, 
46 We follow Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980), and calculate the effect of the indicator variable (i.e., AFI) averaging 
across column 1-4 as (exp( ) -1)γ , where γ  is the coefficient of interest in our semi-logarithmic equation.  
47 While kernel matching estimator matches the treated units with weighted average of all control units, with weights 
that are inversely proportional to the distance in terms of their propensity score, stratification matching estimator 
divides the common support into different strata and measures the treatment’s effect within each interval. For details 
on the matching methods see Lin and Ye (2007) and De Mendonça and e Souza (2012). 
48 In Abadie and Imbens, we use similar pre-treatment characteristics as in the Online Appendix Table E5 for matching. 
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(ii) using an alternative measure of bank stability, which is calculated taking five years rolling 
windows of standard deviation of return on assets, (iii) dropping cooperative banks and Islamic 
banks from the sample, where regressions are run keeping only commercial banks, (iv) dropping 
countries (e.g., Japan and Italy) that constitute the lion’s share of the sample, (v) running 
regressions only for the sample of developing country, and finally (vi) exploiting cross-country 
and cross-time variation in the inclusive banking agenda, and investigating causal effect of 
enabling inclusive financial environment on banking stability. For all of these alternative setups 
the main findings of this study largely remain unaltered. 
8. Concluding remarks and policy implications 
Broadening access of the disadvantaged groups to formal financial system has numerous 
benefits as documented in the literature, including greater efficiency in the allocation of resources, 
social and political stability, more innovation, and economic growth. When financial system 
becomes more inclusive, this generally results in greater opportunity for banks to diversify lending 
and funding strategies while reducing distance facilitating strong relationship with customers who 
were previously excluded from the formal financial sectors. But, since expanding access of low 
income groups to financial services is perceived as risky, whether financial inclusion is 
complementary or antagonistic to the issue of bank stability remains the subject of a continuing 
debate among academics and policymakers alike both from a theoretical and from an empirical 
perspective. 
This paper has therefore contributed to this debate addressing the most contemporary 
policy issue related to financial development, financial inclusion, and bank stability, using an 
international sample of 2,913 banks in 87 countries for the period 2004 to 2012. First, we have 
constructed a new country-level composite index of financial inclusion using principal components 
analysis, and ranked countries based on the score of this index. Despite the shortcomings of data 
availability, the constructed index has good predictive power in tracking the micro-level indicators 
of Global Findex such as the share of households with savings and bank accounts at formal 
financial institutions as well as the WBES’s firm-level access to finance (and/or financing 
obstacles). Second, given the changing milieu of banking operations, where formal financial 
institutions increasingly searching for new opportunities and markets and seeing the benefits of 
micro-finance style of operations, this is the first study that investigates such an important issue to 
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provide some understanding on the access to finance and bank stability nexus. Considering the 
overriding interest of inclusive economic growth and relatively substantive emphasis on the 
financial stability in the post crisis era, we therefore investigate the influence of inclusive financial 
systems on banking stability in a panel setting. Third, since one of the tasks of bank regulation is 
to curb the adverse effect of banking competition on stability (see Beck et al., 2013), we also check 
whether the relationship between financial inclusion and bank stability changes due to higher 
competition, as measured by lower level of Lerner indices of two variants. Fourth, we check 
whether the institutional settings in which banks operate have any influence on the access-stability 
nexus. Finally, we subject our findings to an array of sensitivity checks including splitting sample 
into terciles based on the financial inclusion index, using alternative measures of banking stability 
and financial inclusion, and using different sample specifications, particularly running regressions 
on the sample of developing countries. We also exploit the cross-country and temporal variation 
in the membership timing of developing countries’ into a network of financial inclusion of 
policymakers and explore whether enabling inclusive financial environment has any causal effect 
on banking stability, using parametric (difference-in-differences) as well as semi-parametric 
matching estimators.  
Our results indicate that there is a strong link between financial inclusion and bank 
stability. In particular, the higher the degree of financial inclusion, the better is the banking 
stability. The evidence also suggests that any beneficial effects of financial inclusion on bank 
stability tend to be more pronounced in banking sectors with less competition. As banks expand 
operations towards new markets to serve previously underserved and/or excluded adult population, 
they are able to reduce excessive risk taking if the environment in which they operate is less 
competitive. Furthermore, investigating the influence of institutional settings on the access-
stability relationship, we also find that the positive impact of financial inclusion on stability 
reinforces if the country in which banks operate has greater institutional quality. Specifically, 
greater freedom of expression, political stability, regulatory quality, and rule of law enhance the 
positive relationship between financial inclusion and bank stability. The DID approach shows that 
supporting inclusive financial system increases soundness of banks of the treated countries by 
almost 36%. Consistent with these findings, we also find that industries that are naturally 
composed of small firms, and that are heavy users of external finance grow faster in economies 
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with higher levels of financial inclusion as more inclusive financial sectors mitigate market 
frictions while ensuring efficient allocation of credit to the real sector of an economy.   
Our results have important policy implications. The findings suggest that banking 
stability is strongly influenced by the degree to which the poorest of the poor individuals and small 
enterprises have access to basic financial services, which indicates the importance of ensuring an 
inclusive financial system. An inclusive financial system will allow banks to exploit the untapped 
potential of customers who were previously unbanked or under-banked, and strengthen their 
balance sheets while making them more resilient against a possible future shock. Since expanding 
access to financial services is a key ingredient of financial development strategies, the concerted 
and sustained efforts of formal financial institutions to allocate resources in more productive areas 
of the economy would make them more profitable. Existing evidence supports this notion that 
average profitability is higher if lenders provide loans repeatedly to the same customer because of 
less default probabilities associated with experienced borrowers (see Karlan and Zinman, 2010). 
As only 41% people in the developing countries compared to 89% in developed ones have bank 
accounts (see Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper, 2012), additional policies should focus on ensuring 
access for all of the excluded from formal financial services, especially in the developing ones.  
Furthermore, our results also stress the importance of the underlying competitive and 
institutional framework. The beneficial effects of financial inclusion on bank stability are more in 
countries where market power of banks and country’s institutional qualities are high. In this 
respect, since competition is perceived to be instrumental to broadening access to finance but 
detrimental to banking stability, broadening access without paying attention to potential negative 
consequences of competition on financial stability is obviously suboptimal. Therefore, it is 
important for the authorities to strike the right balance between financial inclusion and bank 
competition while avoiding financial fragility. They should also continue the efforts of establishing 
an institutional environment that will complement the access-stability nexus. In the end, however, 
only more empirical research using both supply- and demand-side data on access will provide 
comprehensive picture of the effects of financial inclusion on banking stability and whether bank 
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Variable definitions and data sources 
Variable Definitions Source 
Dependent Variables   
Zscore Sum of return-on-assets (ROA), defined as net profit over assets, and equity ratio (EQA), defined as equity over assets, 
divided by standard deviation of (ROA) of each bank over past three years (calculated using a rolling window) 
BankScope 
Volatility of ROA Standard deviation of ROA for each bank, calculated over past 3 years BankScope 
Financial Inclusion   
Penetration The number of deposit and loan accounts per 1000 adults IMF 
Availability The outreach dimension constructed using principal component analysis (PCA) from the variables related to geographic 
and demographic availability of branches and ATMs 
Authors’ calculation 
Usage Total volume of deposit and loans relative to GDP IMF 
Financial inclusion index Financial inclusion index is constructed using PCA from the penetration, availability and usage dimensions. Authors’ calculation 
Bank competition   
C-Lerner A bank-level non-structural indicator of bank competition, measured by using a stochastic frontier analysis approach 
assuming full bank efficiency, with lower values indicating higher competition in the banking sector 
Authors’ calculation 
E-Lerner A bank-level non-structural indicator of bank competition, an efficiency-adjusted Lerner index, measured by using a 
stochastic frontier analysis approach, with lower values indicating higher competition in the banking sector 
Authors’ calculation 
Firm-specific variables   
Access to finance Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has access to bank finance (loan, overdraft or line of credit) WBES 
Financing Obstacle  Financing obstacle is defined on five point scale how problematic is financing for the operation and growth of business: (0) 
No obstacle (1) minor obstacle (2) moderate obstacle (3) major obstacle, and (4) very severe obstacle. 
WBES 
Firm size (employees) The number of permanent full-time employees WBES 
Manufacturing Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is in the manufacturing sector WBES 
Exporter Dummy variable equal to 1 if 10 percent or more of sales are exported directly or indirectly by the firm WBES 
Foreign-owned Dummy variable equal to 1 if 50 percent or more of the firm is owned by foreign organisations WBES 
Government-owned Dummy variable equal to 1 if 10 percent or more of the firm is owned by the government WBES 
Firm age Age of the firm in years WBES 
Industry-specific variables   
Growth rate in real value added Annual (compounded) growth rate in real value added for 2000-2010 in a particular industry in each country over 2000-
2010. 
UNIDO INDSTAT4, 2010 
Share in value added in 2000 The industry’s share in total value added in manufacturing in 2000 for each industry in each country. UNIDO INDSTAT4, 2010 
External finance dependence 
 
The fraction of capital expenditures not financed with internal funds for US firms in the same industry between 1980 and 
1990. It is defined as the difference between capital expenditures and cash flow from operations scaled by capital 
expenditures. 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) 
Small firm share (< N employees) Small firm share is the industry’s share of employment by firms with less than N employees (N is either 5 or 10 or 20). 
These industry level variables are calculated by using data from the US Census on all US firms for the year 1997. 
Beck et al. (2008) 
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Variable Definitions Source 
Bank-specific variables   
Loan ratio Total performing loans divided by total assets BankScope 
Loan loss provisions (LLP) Total loan loss provision divided by total assets BankScope 
Income diversification  Non-interest income divided by total operating income BankScope 
Management quality Total earning assets divided by total assets BankScope 
Equity ratio Total equity divided by total assets BankScope 
Country-specific variables   
GDP growth rate The growth rate of GDP World Bank 
GDP per capita The natural logarithm of per capita GDP World Bank 
Voice and accountability (Voice) The indicator measures the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as 
well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and free media. Higher values mean greater political rights 
Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi (2010) 
Political stability (Political) The indicator measures the perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by 
unconstitutional or violent means, including political violence and terrorism. Higher values mean more stable political 
environment 











The indicator measures the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence 
from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to such policies. Higher values mean higher quality of public and civil service 
Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi (2010) 
Regulatory quality (Regulatory) The indicator measures the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that 
permit and promote market competition and private-sector development. Higher values mean higher quality of regulation 
Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi (2010) 
Rule of law (Law) The indicator measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular 
the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Higher 
values mean stronger law and order. 
Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi (2010) 
Control of corruption (Corruption) The indicator measures the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms 
of corruption, as well as ‘‘capture’’ of the state by elites and private interests. Higher values indicate better control of 
corruption. 
Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi (2010) 
Institutional quality index (IQI) Institutional quality index is constructed using principal component analysis from the Voice, Political, Government, 
Regulatory, Law, and Corruption indexes of Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010) 
Authors’ calculation 
Legal efficiency Legal efficiency is the country’s efficiency of the legal system. Higher values indicate more efficient legal system. La Porta et al. (1998) 
Property rights Property rights is a measure of the degree to which a country’s laws protect private property rights and the degree to which 
its government enforces those laws. 
Heritage Foundation (2014) 
Credit information depth Credit information depth is a measure of the degree to which credit information is available through either a public credit 
registry or a private credit bureau. 
Djankov et al. (2007), 




Principal component analysis for financial inclusion index 
Panel A Notation PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 
Eigenvalue  2.81 0.69 0.45 0.05 
% of variance  0.70 0.17 0.11 0.01 
Variable 
Geographic penetration of Branches AGB 0.52 -0.46 -0.38 -0.61 
Geographic penetration of ATMs AGA 0.52 -0.50 0.34 0.61 
Demographic penetration of Branches ADB 0.47 0.55 -0.59 0.36 
Demographic penetration of ATMs ADA 0.48 0.50 0.63 -0.35 
Panel B   PC1 PC2 PC3   
Eigenvalue  1.54 0.99 0.46  
% of variance  0.51 0.33 0.15  
Variable 
Accessibility/Penetration Dimension Penetration 0.71 -0.02 -0.71  
Availability Dimension Availability 0.71 -0.06 0.71  
Usage Dimension Usage 0.06 1.00 0.03   
Note: AGB = the number of branches per 1,000 km2; AGA = the number of ATMs per 1,000 km2; ADB = the number of branches per 100,000 
adults; ADA = the number of ATM per 100,000 adults; Penetration = the number of deposit and loan accounts per 1000 adults; Availability = The 
Outreach Dimension; Usage = Total volume of deposit and loans relative to GDP. 
 
Table C1 
Inclusive financial system and firm financing obstacle or access to finance, firm level results 
We run ordered probit model when Financing Obstacle is the dependent variable and logit model for the case of 
Access to Finance. In both cases, robust standard errors are reported in the brackets. Both dependent variables are 
constructed using the World Bank Enterprise Surveys. In the case of former, firms were asked to rate on a five point 
scale how much of an obstacle is access to finance for the operation and growth of the business: (0) No obstacle (1) 
minor obstacle (2) moderate obstacle (3) major obstacle (4) very severe obstacle. For the latter case, Access to Finance 
is a dummy variable that indicates whether the firm has access to a loan, overdraft, or a line of credit. The firm size is 
the logarithm of the firms’ total number of permanent employees. The dummy variable Exporter indicates that firms 
are involved in exporting. The Manufacturing dummy indicates that a firm is in the manufacturing sector. 
Government-owned and Foreign-owned are dummies that is equal one if the firm has government or foreign 
ownership, respectively. Log firm age is the logarithm of the firm’s age in years. GDP growth rate is the annual 
growth rate in percentage. Regional dummies are Sub-Sahara Africa, Asia and Pacific, Europe, Americas, and South 
Asia, with the Middle East and North Africa being the omitted category. . ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys and WDI. Coverage: 2004-2012. 
  Financing Obstacle Access to Finance 
VARIABLES coefficient se coefficient se 
Financial Inclusion -0.361*** [0.040] 2.570*** [0.088] 
Log firm size (employees) -0.046*** [0.004] 0.174*** [0.009] 
Exporter -0.024* [0.015] 0.594*** [0.031] 
Manufacturing 0.143*** [0.012] -0.193*** [0.025] 
Foreign-owned (>=50% shares) -0.250*** [0.020] -0.199*** [0.041] 
Government-owned (>=10% shares) -0.065* [0.037] -0.894*** [0.076] 
Log Firm Age -0.079*** [0.011] 0.370*** [0.022] 
GDP growth rate 0.002* [0.001] -0.066*** [0.003] 
Sub-Sahara Africa 0.374*** [0.057] 0.512*** [0.120] 
Asia and Pacific -0.371*** [0.057] 0.337*** [0.121] 
Europe 0.268*** [0.059] -0.245** [0.125] 
Americas 0.199*** [0.057] 1.109*** [0.121] 
South Asia 0.230*** [0.067] 0.560*** [0.139] 
Observations 38,987   38,987   
No of countries 64  64  




Table D1  
The Alliance for Financial Inclusion membership timing across countries 
Country Year Country Year Country Year Country Year 
Afghanistan 2009 Colombia 2009 Malaysia 2009 South Africa 2010 
Angola 2011 Ecuador 2010 Mongolia 2010 Tanzania 2010 
Armenia 2011 El Salvador 2009 Mozambique 2011 Thailand 2009 
Bangladesh 2009 Ghana 2010 Namibia 2011 Uganda 2009 
Brazil 2010 India 2009 Pakistan 2009 Yemen, Rep. 2009 
Burundi 2009 Indonesia 2009 Panama 2009 Zambia 2010 
Cameroon 2009 Jamaica 2010 Philippines 2009   
Chile 2011 Kenya 2009 Rwanda 2009     
Source: http://www.afi-global.org/afi-network/members 
Note: the years indicate when country become member of AFI and participated into cooperative and consultative 
efforts to enhance financial inclusion in their countries. 30 out of 87 countries’ central bank become member of AFI 




Panel A: Bank-level analysis Mean  Median SD Min Max N 
Z-score 3.72 3.76 1.35 0.30 7.72 13836 
Volatility of ROA 6.08 6.01 1.41 0.81 12.13 13836 
Penetration 0.51 0.38 0.35 0.00 1.00 13836 
Availability 0.63 0.79 0.34 0.01 1.00 13836 
Usage 0.12 0.00 0.22 0.00 1.00 13836 
Financial inclusion index 0.57 0.61 0.30 0.01 0.98 13836 
C-Lerner 0.05 0.09 0.29 -1.39 0.80 13836 
E-Lerner 0.13 0.14 0.24 -0.75 0.88 13836 
Loan ratio 0.55 0.57 0.19 0.00 1.00 13836 
Total assets 7.12 6.96 1.90 -1.83 14.91 13836 
LLP ratio 0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.28 2.69 13836 
Income diversification  0.16 0.14 0.82 -24.25 82.21 13836 
Management quality 0.91 0.95 0.10 0.03 1.11 13836 
Equity ratio 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.93 13836 
Systemic banking crisis dummy 0.06 0.00 0.24 0.00 1.00 13836 
GDP growth rate 0.02 0.02 0.04 -0.18 0.23 13836 
GDP per capita 9.52 10.28 1.35 4.99 11.12 13836 
Property rights 59.41 55.00 21.43 0.00 90.00 13836 
Credit information depth 4.69 5.00 1.60 0.00 6.00 13784 
Voice and accountability  0.68 0.95 0.70 -2.10 1.75 13836 
Political stability  0.33 0.51 0.81 -2.81 1.49 13836 
Government effectiveness  0.71 0.45 0.86 -1.37 2.43 13836 
Regulatory quality  0.71 0.95 0.73 -1.62 1.96 13836 
Rule of law  0.61 0.42 0.91 -1.69 1.98 13836 
Control of corruption  0.58 0.25 0.98 -1.46 2.27 13836 
Institutional quality index  0.00 -0.01 2.31 -6.30 3.71 13836 
Panel B: Firm-level analysis Mean  Median SD Min Max N 
Access to Finance 0.61 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 38987 
Financing Obstacle 1.54 1.00 1.36 0.00 4.00 38987 
Log firm size (employees) 2.55 2.30 1.49 0.00 11.51 38987 
Exporter 0.20 0.00 0.40 0.00 1.00 38987 
Manufacturing 0.58 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 38987 
Foreign-owned (>=50% shares) 0.10 0.00 0.30 0.00 1.00 38987 
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Government-owned (>=10% shares) 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.00 1.00 38987 
Log Firm Age 3.01 2.94 0.55 0.69 5.37 38987 
Panel C: industry growth analysis Mean  Median SD Min Max N 
Growth rate in real value added 0.04 0.03 0.08 -0.20 0.84 672 
Share in value added in 2000 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.38 672 
External finance dependence 0.34 0.24 0.38 -0.15 1.49 672 
Small firm share (< 5 employees) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04 578 
Small firm share (< 10 employees) 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.10 578 
Small firm share (< 20 employees) 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.20 603 
Financial inclusion index 0.49 0.46 0.28 0.06 0.99 672 
E-Lerner 0.12 0.17 0.27 -0.74 0.63 672 
GDP per capita 9.23 9.82 1.34 6.33 11.09 672 
Legal efficiency 7.50 7.25 2.12 2.50 10.00 672 
Property rights 4.11 4.00 0.84 3.00 5.00 672 
Credit information depth 4.60 5.00 1.46 0.00 6.00 672 





The estimation results for the banking stability and financial inclusion.  
Source: Author’s calculation.  
Country Zscore Financial 
inclusion 
index 
Penetration Availability Usage No. of 
Banks 
Asia       
Afghanistan 16.83 0.012 (87) 0.015 (80) 0.01 (87) 0.015 (37) 9 
Armenia 48.67 0.224 (56) 0.254 (51) 0.187 (51) 0.097 (18) 14 
Azerbaijan 29.07 0.136 (65) 0.121 (61) 0.134 (63) 0 (86) 21 
Bangladesh 79.28 0.46 (23) 0.32 (41) 0.594 (16) 0.08 (19) 12 
Cambodia 42.98 0.072 (74) 0.023 (77) 0.043 (77) 0.906 (4) 12 
Cyprus 27.84 0.365 (37) 0 (83) 0.732 (13) 0.001 (67) 13 
Georgia 21.59 0.285 (47) 0.385 (30) 0.187 (52) 0.001 (69) 12 
Hong Kong SAR, China 81.60 0.389 (31) 0 (83) 0.775 (10) 0.037 (26) 28 
India 94.71 0.373 (35) 0.317 (42) 0.421 (23) 0.025 (33) 62 
Indonesia 59.24 0.233 (54) 0.286 (48) 0.097 (67) 1 (1) 61 
Japan 124.72 0.977 (3) 1 (1) 0.937 (4) 0.195 (14) 457 
Jordan 102.00 0.272 (48) 0.382 (32) 0.167 (54) 0.001 (72) 12 
Kazakhstan 59.26 0.304 (44) 0.488 (23) 0.116 (65) 0.065 (23) 27 
Korea, Rep. 57.60 0.991 (1) 0.927 (6) 0.992 (1) 1 (1) 14 
Kuwait 52.57 0.292 (46) 0.294 (46) 0.292 (32) 0 (87) 12 
Lebanon 109.28 0.496 (18) 0.347 (37) 0.555 (18) 1 (1) 33 
Malaysia 46.29 0.48 (21) 0.709 (13) 0.251 (38) 0.005 (46) 14 
Mongolia 31.58 0.421 (26) 0.336 (39) 0.285 (33) 0.652 (7) 3 
Pakistan 55.04 0.076 (73) 0.079 (64) 0.074 (70) 0.021 (34) 11 
Philippines 68.94 0.116 (66) 0.089 (63) 0.141 (60) 0.032 (30) 22 
Saudi Arabia 55.85 0.271 (49) 0.373 (33) 0.141 (62) 0.002 (63) 12 
Singapore 84.71 0.368 (36) 0 (83) 0.736 (12) 0.003 (50) 13 
Thailand 78.85 0.475 (22) 0.652 (15) 0.295 (31) 0.037 (25) 21 
Turkey 56.40 0.524 (16) 0.812 (11) 0.236 (41) 0.001 (77) 27 
United Arab Emirates 76.16 0.296 (45) 0.345 (38) 0.214 (48) 0.003 (53) 24 
Uzbekistan 85.38 0.138 (64) 0.01 (82) 0.233 (42) 0.404 (9) 9 
Yemen, Rep. 43.20 0.021 (86) 0.02 (78) 0.018 (86) 0.037 (27) 6 
Average/Total 62.58 0.336 0.318 0.328 0.208 961 
Europe       
Austria 112.13 0.354 (39) 0.274 (49) 0.434 (22) 0.001 (79) 158 
Belgium 79.91 0.981 (2) 0.939 (4) 0.961 (2) 0.002 (56) 27 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 91.98 0.312 (43) 0.327 (40) 0.264 (35) 0.001 (73) 19 
Bulgaria 46.98 0.711 (8) 0.835 (9) 0.586 (17) 0.002 (59) 17 
Croatia 81.44 0.386 (33) 0.261 (50) 0.459 (20) 0.003 (49) 29 
Estonia 46.91 0.618 (11) 0.931 (5) 0.3 (30) 0.008 (40) 7 
Finland 53.05 0.542 (15) 0.885 (8) 0.252 (37) 0.001 (78) 10 
Greece 59.62 0.545 (14) 0.627 (17) 0.457 (21) 0.001 (66) 10 
Hungary 49.68 0.417 (27) 0.412 (28) 0.407 (24) 0.186 (15) 22 
Iceland 26.78 0.206 (58) 0 (83) 0.401 (25) 0.139 (17) 5 
Ireland 38.98 0.489 (20) 0.368 (35) 0.611 (15) 0.001 (64) 8 
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Country Zscore Financial 
inclusion 
index 
Penetration Availability Usage No. of 
Banks 
Italy 92.70 0.564 (12) 0.184 (54) 0.944 (3) 0.001 (82) 489 
Latvia 22.59 0.393 (30) 0.482 (24) 0.305 (29) 0.001 (75) 19 
Macedonia, FYR 52.70 0.492 (19) 0.685 (14) 0.247 (39) 0.027 (32) 13 
Malta 131.28 0.921 (4) 1 (1) 0.841 (7) 0.001 (65) 7 
Moldova 34.96 0.327 (42) 0.528 (20) 0.126 (64) 0.005 (45) 12 
Montenegro 64.28 0.386 (32) 0.429 (26) 0.307 (28) 0.001 (71) 7 
Netherlands 67.89 0.83 (5) 0.913 (7) 0.747 (11) 0.001 (74) 27 
Norway 40.00 0.089 (69) 0 (83) 0.179 (53) 0.015 (38) 12 
Portugal 31.27 0.785 (7) 0.647 (16) 0.923 (5) 0.002 (61) 18 
Serbia 36.48 0.385 (34) 0.401 (29) 0.337 (27) 0.073 (21) 28 
Spain 115.74 0.816 (6) 0.752 (12) 0.879 (6) 0.001 (68) 89 
Switzerland 330.24 0.694 (9) 0.585 (18) 0.803 (8) 0.002 (54) 124 
Ukraine 38.50 0.52 (17) 0.824 (10) 0.202 (50) 0.004 (48) 14 
United Kingdom 62.97 0.405 (29) 0.026 (76) 0.785 (9) 0 (83) 95 
Average/Total 72.36 0.527 0.533 0.510 0.019 1266 
Americas       
Argentina 38.53 0.256 (51) 0.373 (34) 0.141 (61) 0.001 (81) 50 
Bahamas, The 98.50 0.429 (25) 0.522 (21) 0.34 (26) 0.001 (80) 11 
Bolivia 42.00 0.083 (70) 0.071 (67) 0.075 (69) 0.003 (51) 10 
Brazil 38.95 0.455 (24) 0.357 (36) 0.467 (19) 0.002 (55) 104 
Chile 81.40 0.622 (10) 0.995 (3) 0.222 (46) 0.31 (12) 24 
Colombia 68.90 0.414 (28) 0.545 (19) 0.149 (58) 0.77 (6) 21 
Costa Rica 66.25 0.362 (38) 0.417 (27) 0.264 (36) 0.512 (8) 42 
Dominican Republic 45.88 0.184 (61) 0.132 (59) 0.228 (45) 0.007 (42) 57 
Ecuador 76.19 0.191 (60) 0.175 (56) 0.209 (49) 0 (84) 19 
El Salvador 56.15 0.206 (57) 0.182 (55) 0.232 (43) 0 (85) 13 
Honduras 81.41 0.143 (63) 0.142 (58) 0.144 (59) 0.009 (39) 15 
Jamaica 79.12 0.343 (41) 0.471 (25) 0.229 (44) 0.019 (35) 5 
Nicaragua 37.53 0.081 (71) 0.108 (62) 0.055 (71) 0.006 (43) 5 
Panama 67.11 0.258 (50) 0.3 (45) 0.216 (47) 0.002 (62) 41 
Peru 60.55 0.24 (52) 0.244 (52) 0.238 (40) 0.002 (58) 15 
Trinidad and Tobago 72.20 0.345 (40) 0.382 (31) 0.273 (34) 0.002 (57) 9 
Venezuela, RB 27.79 0.236 (53) 0.306 (44) 0.15 (57) 0.001 (70) 27 
Average/Total 61.09 0.285 0.337 0.214 0.097 468 
Africa       
Algeria 52.52 0.079 (72) 0.127 (60) 0.028 (82) 0.051 (24) 12 
Angola 29.28 0.047 (80) 0.04 (70) 0.05 (73) 0.065 (22) 12 
Botswana 31.01 0.199 (59) 0.307 (43) 0.086 (68) 0.002 (60) 7 
Burundi 22.35 0.051 (79) 0.027 (75) 0.043 (76) 0.387 (10) 5 
Cameroon 56.97 0.033 (83) 0.015 (81) 0.047 (75) 0.077 (20) 8 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 52.70 0.102 (68) 0.155 (57) 0.05 (74) 0.004 (47) 21 
Ghana 41.46 0.059 (76) 0.072 (66) 0.041 (78) 0.019 (36) 17 
Kenya 63.71 0.055 (77) 0.072 (65) 0.037 (79) 0.034 (29) 29 
Libya 151.23 0.051 (78) 0.053 (69) 0.051 (72) 0.001 (76) 6 
Malawi 57.49 0.027 (85) 0.028 (73) 0.025 (83) 0.032 (31) 5 
Mauritius 59.91 0.557 (13) 0.497 (22) 0.616 (14) 0.036 (28) 12 
Mozambique 35.35 0.03 (84) 0.027 (74) 0.034 (80) 0.008 (41) 10 
Namibia 108.44 0.231 (55) 0.292 (47) 0.109 (66) 0.003 (52) 6 
Rwanda 20.65 0.112 (67) 0.06 (68) 0.151 (56) 0.186 (16) 7 
South Africa 43.07 0.182 (62) 0.209 (53) 0.155 (55) 0.006 (44) 14 
Tanzania 74.09 0.034 (82) 0.028 (72) 0.02 (85) 0.27 (13) 21 
Uganda 35.78 0.044 (81) 0.036 (71) 0.025 (84) 0.341 (11) 14 
Zambia 22.05 0.071 (75) 0.018 (79) 0.032 (81) 0.837 (5) 12 















The effect of financial inclusion on banking stability  
The dependent variable is the Zscore–defined as the sum of return-on-assets and equity ratio divided by standard deviation of return-on-assets of 
each bank over past three years–reported in columns 1-2. As robustness tests, we use alternative bank stability proxy i.e., the (negative of the) 
standard deviation of a bank’s return-on-assets. In this case, we follow Beck et al. (2013), and transform standard deviation of return-on-assets to 
make it directly proportional to bank stability–reported in columns 3-4. Bank competition is proxied by two variants of the Lerner indices i.e., 
conventional Lerner (C-Lerner) and efficiency-adjusted Lerner (E-Lerner). The Lerner index is interpreted as inverse of competition; the higher 
the index greater is the pricing power and implies less competitive market conditions. Loan ratio is measured as loans as a percentage of total 
assets. Bank size is the logarithm of total assets valued in million US dollar. Loan loss provision ratio is measured as a percentage of total assets, 
where income diversification is the ratio of non-interest income over total income. The management quality is measured as the total earning assets 
over total assets. Capitalisation is the bank total equity to asset ratio. To control for economic development, logarithm of GDP per capita is used, 
and GDP growth rate is used to account for condition of business cycle in each country. We employ instrumental variable (IV) technique with a 
GMM estimator. All regressions include year and bank fixed effects. Financial inclusion index is treated as endogenous variable, and it is 
instrumented via financial freedom, entry density and financial freedom times entry density. We report heteroskedasticity-autocorrelation robust 




1 2 3 4 
C-Lerner E-Lerner C-Lerner E-Lerner 
Loan Ratio 0.115 0.074 -0.06 -0.09 
 [0.230] [0.232] [0.219] [0.221] 
Bank Size 0.397*** 0.440*** 0.420*** 0.452*** 
 [0.080] [0.080] [0.076] [0.076] 
Loan Loss Provision -2.102 -2.032 -2.091 -2.039* 
 [1.448] [1.336] [1.300] [1.220] 
Income Diversification 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.005 
 [0.014] [0.013] [0.015] [0.014] 
Management Quality 1.432*** 1.474*** 1.242*** 1.277*** 
 [0.343] [0.347] [0.335] [0.337] 
Capitalisation 4.110*** 3.900*** 1.264*** 1.135*** 
 [0.495] [0.496] [0.433] [0.435] 
C-Lerner (-1) 0.714***  0.527***  
 [0.072]  [0.066]  
E-Lerner (-1)  1.331***  0.929*** 
  [0.135]  [0.127] 
Financial inclusion index 6.272*** 6.518*** 6.299*** 6.489*** 
 [1.795] [1.810] [1.715] [1.731] 
GDP Growth Rate 5.253*** 5.269*** 5.062*** 5.090*** 
 [0.881] [0.881] [0.842] [0.843] 
Per Capita GDP -2.137*** -2.565*** -2.551*** -2.854*** 
 [0.702] [0.721] [0.676] [0.696] 
Observations 11,499 11,499 11,499 11,499 
2nd-stage F-test 41.95*** 42.34*** 41.58*** 40.73*** 
Under id test: KP LM statistic 80.54*** 77.81*** 80.54*** 77.81*** 
Hansen J-test (p-value) 5.12 (0.08) 3.33 (0.19) 5.31 (0.07) 3.98 (0.14) 



















Interactive effect of financial inclusion and bank competition on stability  
The dependent variable is the Zscore–defined as the sum of return-on-assets and equity ratio divided by standard deviation of return-on-assets of 
each bank over past three years–reported in columns 1-2. As robustness tests, we use alternative bank stability proxy i.e., the (negative of the) 
standard deviation of a bank’s return-on-assets. In this case, we follow Beck et al. (2013), and transform standard deviation of return-on-assets to 
make it directly proportional to bank stability–reported in columns 3-4. Bank competition is proxied by two variants of the Lerner indices i.e., 
conventional Lerner (C-Lerner) and efficiency-adjusted Lerner (E-Lerner). The Lerner index is interpreted as inverse of competition; the higher 
the index greater is the pricing power and implies less competitive market conditions. Loan ratio is measured as loans as a percentage of total 
assets. Bank size is the logarithm of total assets valued in million US dollar. Loan loss provision ratio is measured as a percentage of total assets, 
where income diversification is the ratio of non-interest income over total income. The management quality is measured as the total earning assets 
over total assets. Capitalisation is the bank total equity to asset ratio. To control for economic development, logarithm of GDP per capita is used, 
and GDP growth rate is used to account for condition of business cycle in each country. We employ instrumental variable (IV) technique with a 
GMM estimator. All regressions include year and bank fixed effects. Financial inclusion index and Financial inclusion index times C-Lerner (E-
Lerner) are treated as endogenous variables, and they are instrumented following Table 3. We report heteroskedasticity-autocorrelation robust 




1 2 3 4 
C-Lerner E-Lerner C-Lerner E-Lerner 
Loan Ratio 0.119 0.058 -0.055 -0.101 
 [0.231] [0.232] [0.220] [0.221] 
Bank Size 0.404*** 0.441*** 0.428*** 0.453*** 
 [0.081] [0.080] [0.077] [0.076] 
Loan Loss Provision -2.104 -2.051 -2.095 -2.053* 
 [1.451] [1.336] [1.303] [1.220] 
Income Diversification 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.005 
 [0.014] [0.013] [0.015] [0.014] 
Management Quality 1.460*** 1.480*** 1.271*** 1.282*** 
 [0.343] [0.348] [0.335] [0.338] 
Capitalisation 4.146*** 3.880*** 1.302*** 1.120** 
 [0.497] [0.497] [0.435] [0.436] 
C-Lerner (-1) 0.334  0.089  
 [0.209]  [0.186]  
E-Lerner (-1)  1.135***  0.786*** 
  [0.153]  [0.142] 
Financial inclusion index  6.418*** 6.552*** 6.454*** 6.519*** 
 [1.787] [1.813] [1.709] [1.733] 
Financial inclusion index X C-Lerner 0.543**  0.626***  
 [0.258]  [0.233]  
Financial inclusion index X E-Lerner  0.410***  0.298** 
  [0.139]  [0.117] 
GDP Growth Rate 5.367*** 5.315*** 5.190*** 5.127*** 
 [0.871] [0.880] [0.834] [0.842] 
Per Capita GDP -2.257*** -2.649*** -2.685*** -2.917*** 
 [0.689] [0.719] [0.664] [0.694] 
Observations 11,499 11,499 11,499 11,499 
2nd-stage F-test 41.63*** 40.72*** 41.15*** 39.03*** 
Under id test: KP LM statistic 80.82*** 77.44*** 80.82*** 77.44*** 
Hansen J-test (p-value) 5.44 (0.07) 3.59 (0.17) 5.68 (0.06) 4.19 (0.12) 
AR chi-squared test 28.28*** 25.54*** 30.75*** 28.18*** 

















Table 5  
The impact of financial inclusion and institutional quality interactions on banking stability 
This table reports IV-GMM regressions of banking stability (i.e., log(Zscore)) on financial inclusion, six measures of institutional quality and their 
interactions. The analogous bank and macro controls are used as in equation (6). We use lagged values of efficiency adjusted Lerner index as the 
proxy for bank competition. Each interaction and its constituents are entered one at a time. For the sake of brevity, the results of the controls are 
not reported in this table but available upon request. Financial inclusion index and financial inclusion index times each institutional quality variables 
are treated as endogenous variables. The instrumental variables are financial freedom, a measure that shows the degree of openness of the banking 
system; labour freedom, a measure that considers various aspects of the legal and regulatory framework of a country’s labour market including 
regulations concerning minimum wages, laws inhibiting layoffs, severance requirements, and measurable regulatory restraints on hiring and hours 
worked from the Heritage Foundation; entry density, a variable refers to the number of newly registered companies with limited liability per 1,000 
working-age people (those ages 15-64) is from World Bank Doing Business Database; credit information depth, a measure that shows the degree 
to which credit information is available through either a public credit registry or a private credit bureau is from Djankov et al. (2007), World Bank 
Entrepreneurship Database. Instruments are reported at the bottom of this table. The institutional variables are collected from Kaufmann et al. 
(2010) dataset. The variable Voice and accountability (Voice) measures the degree of freedom of expressions and free media in a country. Political 
stability (Political) captures the perception of probability that the government is destabilized or overthrown by nonviolent or non-constitutional 
means. The variable Government effectiveness (Government) measures the quality in formulation and implementation and the commitment of the 
government with related policies. The regulatory quality (Regulatory) indicates the perception ability of a government to formulate and to 
implement political regulations that allow promoting development of the private sector. The variable rule of law (Law) measures the perception of 
agents about its confidence in the existing norms and the degree in which they can rely that the contracts will be fulfilled and the property rights 
will be protect by the courts. The variable control of corruption (Corruption) indicates the perception on magnitude in which the public power is 
exerted to obtain private gains. These six indicators are measured in units ranging from about -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better 
governance and institutional quality. In column 7, we capture common variation among these six governance indicators using the principal 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Financial inclusion index (FII) 3.426*** 8.197*** 5.298*** 1.277 5.804*** 6.216*** 10.878*** 
 [1.275] [2.413] [1.580] [2.213] [1.714] [1.947] [2.977] 
Voice and accountability (Voice) -2.135*       
 [1.162]       
FII x Voice 7.391***       
 [2.105]       
Political stability (Political)  -2.228**      
  [1.127]      
FII x Political  5.946**      
  [2.677]      
Government effectiveness (Government)   0.744     
   [1.402]     
FII x Government   -2.697     
   [3.161]     
Regulatory quality (Regulatory)    -10.640**    
    [5.118]    
FII x Regulatory    21.321**    
    [10.272]    
Rule of law (Law)     -2.792***   
     [0.980]   
FII x Law     5.983**   
     [3.008]   
Control of corruption (Corruption)      0.639  
      [0.862]  
FII x Corruption      0.207  
      [1.436]  
Institutional quality index (IQI)       -0.606 
       [0.477] 
FII x IQI       2.347** 
        [1.139] 
Observations 11,450 11,499 11,499 11,499 11,499 11,499 11,499 
Bank and Macro controls √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Bank and year fixed effects √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
2nd-stage F-test 42.66*** 36.51*** 40.37*** 26.08*** 38.85*** 42.58*** 39.56*** 
Under id test: KP LM statistic 54.32*** 46.39*** 63.11*** 9.28*** 74.99*** 85.81*** 71.97*** 
Hansen J-test (p-value) 1.19 (0.28) 0.02 (0.90) 4.57 (0.10) 0.62 (0.43) 1.07 (0.30) 4.72 (0.09) 1.62 (0.44) 
AR chi-squared test 29.05*** 21.32*** 24.04*** 25.25*** 24.72*** 27.75*** 26.75*** 
Endogeneity test 29.04*** 31.18*** 21.47*** 31.67*** 20.77*** 23.82*** 38.23*** 
Instruments        
Financial freedom √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Labour freedom  √ √ √  √ √ 
Entry density √  √ √ √ √ √ 
Entry density * Financial freedom   √  √ √  
Entry density * Labour freedom       √ 
Credit information depth √       
Marginal effect 8.42*** 10.13*** 2.97 16.46** 9.44*** 6.34* 10.88*** 
One standard deviation above average ↑ 13.61*** 14.95*** 0.01 32.01*** 14.88*** 6.54** 16.29*** 
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Table 6 
The effect of Global financial inclusion (GFI) on banking stability 
In this table, we use Global Financial Inclusion Index (Global Findex) based on World Bank. Since this measure is only available for the year 2011, 
we had to collapse our dataset at bank-level to run cross-sectional regression. Initially we conduct endogeneity test for the Global financial inclusion 
index, which is reported at the bottom of the table. In case of rejecting the null hypothesis of exogeneity, we employ the instrumental variable (IV) 
estimator; otherwise we use the ordinary least square (OLS) estimator with robust standard error, as it is more efficient. When we added interaction 
with GFI (e.g., column 3, 4, 7, and 8), we treated both GFI and its interaction as endogenous variables. We used financial freedom, entry density 
and their interactions as instruments. The underidentification (UT) and over identification (OT) tests are reported by the Anderson canonical 
correlations LM statistic and Sargan’s J-test, respectively to show the relevance and validity of the instruments used for the Global financial 
inclusion index. The definitions of rest of the variables are same as Table 3. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively. Source: BankScope and World Bank. 
  log(Zscore) -log[sd(ROA)] 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
  C-Lerner E-Lerner C-Lerner E-Lerner C-Lerner E-Lerner C-Lerner E-Lerner 
Loan Ratio 0.310* 0.188 -0.009 0.364 0.019 0.115 -0.036 0.776* 
 [0.182] [0.131] [0.129] [0.275] [0.123] [0.124] [0.123] [0.407] 
Bank Size 0.030** 0.047*** 0.038*** 0.122** 0.064*** 0.071*** 0.063*** 0.146*** 
 [0.012] [0.011] [0.011] [0.055] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.045] 
Loan Loss Provision -5.746*** -6.510* -6.375* -4.851*** -6.240** -6.463* -6.279** -4.335*** 
 [0.605] [3.454] [3.281] [1.379] [3.163] [3.315] [3.131] [1.383] 
Income Diversification -0.016 0.01 -0.067 0.034 -0.07 -0.027 -0.094 0.027 
 [0.058] [0.065] [0.054] [0.104] [0.066] [0.061] [0.063] [0.112] 
Management Quality 2.121*** 2.288*** 2.051*** 1.508* 2.320*** 2.355*** 2.204*** 1.056 
 [0.303] [0.326] [0.306] [0.830] [0.297] [0.305] [0.292] [0.833] 







 [0.318] [0.313] [0.309] [0.905] [0.273] [0.275] [0.276] [0.914] 
C-Lerner 0.980***  0.337**  0.615***  0.240*  
 [0.103]  [0.146]  [0.077]  [0.131]  
E-Lerner  0.356***  -4.307  0.06  -4.776* 
  [0.101]  [3.177]  [0.092]  [2.537] 
Global financial inclusion (GFI) 0.018** 0.001 0.005*** 0.009 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.014*** 0.040** 
 [0.007] [0.002] [0.002] [0.008] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.016] 
GFI x C-Lerner   1.443***    1.086***  
   [0.313]    [0.289]  
GFI x E-Lerner    7.501    8.146* 
    [5.113]    [4.166] 











 [1.719] [0.999] [0.976] [3.794] [0.929] [0.942] [0.929] [3.706] 
Per Capita GDP -0.181** 0.013 -0.025 0.02 -0.014 0.007 -0.028 -0.204 
 [0.080] [0.027] [0.027] [0.077] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.162] 
Constant 2.396*** 0.802** 1.447*** 0.715 3.630*** 3.374*** 3.877*** 4.953*** 
 [0.675] [0.392] [0.384] [0.734] [0.357] [0.365] [0.362] [1.327] 
Observations 2,238 2,497 2,497 2,238 2,497 2,497 2,497 2,238 
Estimator IV OLS OLS IV OLS OLS OLS IV 
F-statistics 45.80 24.69 36.37 10.06 123.10 114.90 112.80 27.23 
Adjusted R2 - 0.14 0.19 - 0.39 0.37 0.39 - 
UT: Anderson canon. corr. LM 
 
137.60 - - 2.70 - - - 4.53 
OT (Sargan) (p-value) 2.14 
 
- - 1.10 
 
- - - 3.05 
















Bank stability and detailed financial inclusion sub-indices 
In this table, we use sub-indices of financial inclusion index, and see the impact of three different dimensions on bank stability individually. Initially 
we conduct endogeneity test for each dimensions, which is reported at the bottom of the table. In case of rejecting the null hypothesis of exogeneity, 
we employ the instrumental variable (IV) estimator; otherwise we use the ordinary least square (OLS) estimator as it is more efficient. In both 
cases, we use heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) variance estimation to alleviate both of the problems. In case IV regression, 
each dimensions are instrumented following Table 3. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Source: BankScope, FAS, and WDI. Coverage: 2004-2012. 
VARIABLES log(Zscore) -log[sd(ROA)] log(Zscore) -log[sd(ROA)] log(Zscore) -log[sd(ROA)] 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Loan Ratio 0.242 -0.177 0.666*** 0.462*** 0.676*** 0.479*** 
 [0.205] [0.195] [0.080] [0.079] [0.080] [0.079] 
Bank Size 0.499*** 0.347*** 0.024*** 0.056*** 0.020*** 0.052*** 
 [0.071] [0.064] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008] [0.007] 
Loan Loss Provision -1.998 -2.238* -5.328** -5.432** -5.317** -5.407** 
 [1.333] [1.222] [2.615] [2.515] [2.642] [2.543] 
Income Diversification 0.003 0.002 -0.004 -0.017 -0.004 -0.018 
 [0.013] [0.013] [0.012] [0.011] [0.012] [0.011] 
Management Quality 1.287*** 1.108*** 1.877*** 2.064*** 2.071*** 2.302*** 
 [0.308] [0.306] [0.188] [0.184] [0.192] [0.188] 
Capitalisation 4.015*** 0.587 1.904*** -3.330*** 1.808*** -3.447*** 
 [0.479] [0.374] [0.200] [0.180] [0.199] [0.178] 
E-Lerner 1.286*** 1.188*** 0.536*** 0.066 0.559*** 0.100* 
 [0.126] [0.123] [0.061] [0.056] [0.062] [0.058] 
Accessibility dimension 2.639*** 2.383***     
 [0.732] [0.707]     
Availability dimension   0.586*** 0.737***   
   [0.077] [0.076]   
Usage dimension     0.404*** 0.540*** 
     [0.060] [0.058] 
GDP Growth Rate 4.454*** 3.877*** 3.120*** 3.401*** 1.656*** 1.545*** 
 [0.704] [0.364] [0.550] [0.528] [0.503] [0.488] 
Per Capita GDP -1.414*** -0.986*** 0.057*** 0.095*** 0.163*** 0.229*** 
 [0.446] [0.368] [0.018] [0.018] [0.016] [0.016] 
Constant   0.505** 2.754*** -0.302 1.724*** 
   [0.240] [0.231] [0.258] [0.246] 
Observations 11,499 11,499 13,524 13,524 13,524 13,524 
Estimator IV IV OLS OLS OLS OLS 
F-statistics 44.98 39.64 61.04 180.10 53.79 164.70 
Adjusted R2 - - 0.12 0.26 0.11 0.26 
Under id test: KP LM statistic 141.9*** 126.1*** - - - - 
Hansen J-test (p-value) 5.43 (0.07) 6.14 (0.05) - - - - 














The effect of financial inclusion on bank stability (alternative measure) 
In this table, following Beck et al. (2013), we use an alternative measure of bank stability in which the denominator in equation (1) is calculated 
using five years rolling windows. Financial inclusion index and Financial inclusion index times C-Lerner (E-Lerner) are treated as endogenous 
variables, and they are instrumented following Table 3. The underidentification (UT) and over identification (OT) tests are reported by the 
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) test for weak instruments and Hansen J-test, respectively to show the relevance and validity of the instruments used. 
The Anderson-Rubin Chi2 test shows that financial inclusion index and financial inclusion index times C-Lerner (E-Lerner) are jointly significant. 
The definitions of rest of the variables are same as Table 3. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
C-Lerner E-Lerner C-Lerner E-Lerner C-Lerner E-Lerner C-Lerner E-Lerner 
Loan Ratio 0.17 0.109 0.166 0.106 -0.012 -0.058 -0.012 -0.06 
 [0.215] [0.214] [0.216] [0.214] [0.208] [0.208] [0.208] [0.208] 
Bank Size 0.338*** 0.357*** 0.336*** 0.361*** 0.314*** 0.330*** 0.314*** 0.333*** 
 [0.075] [0.075] [0.076] [0.075] [0.071] [0.071] [0.071] [0.072] 
Loan Loss Provision -2.518*** -2.413*** -2.516*** -2.420*** -2.367*** -2.272*** -2.366*** -2.279*** 
 [0.842] [0.805] [0.842] [0.807] [0.748] [0.719] [0.748] [0.721] 
Income Diversification 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008] [0.007] 
Management Quality 1.186*** 1.199*** 1.192*** 1.198*** 0.934*** 0.945*** 0.942*** 0.944*** 
 [0.339] [0.335] [0.337] [0.336] [0.318] [0.314] [0.316] [0.315] 
Capitalisation 2.691*** 2.463*** 2.689*** 2.457*** 1.033** 0.870** 1.037** 0.865** 
 [0.452] [0.448] [0.450] [0.449] [0.409] [0.412] [0.408] [0.413] 
C-Lerner 0.488***  0.541***  0.401***  0.366**  
 [0.062]  [0.202]  [0.055]  [0.181]  
E-Lerner  1.099***  0.956***  0.832***  0.713*** 
  [0.124]  [0.144]  [0.119]  [0.138] 
Financial Inclusion index  6.688*** 7.032*** 6.724*** 7.016*** 6.628*** 6.883*** 6.671*** 6.873*** 
 [1.811] [1.812] [1.802] [1.816] [1.711] [1.718] [1.704] [1.721] 
Financial Inclusion X C-Lerner   -0.071    0.05  
   [0.237]    [0.212]  
Financial Inclusion X E-Lerner    0.278**    0.231* 
    [0.133]    [0.127] 
GDP Growth Rate 4.414*** 4.518*** 4.423*** 4.539*** 4.315*** 4.402*** 4.340*** 4.421*** 
 [0.891] [0.889] [0.879] [0.890] [0.855] [0.857] [0.845] [0.858] 
Per Capita GDP -2.125*** -2.524*** -2.132*** -2.562*** -2.404*** -2.697*** -2.431*** -2.729*** 
 [0.806] [0.818] [0.790] [0.818] [0.779] [0.794] [0.766] [0.794] 
Observations 9,338 9,338 9,338 9,338 9,338 9,338 9,338 9,338 
2nd-stage F-test 16.01*** 16.86*** 15.52*** 16.11*** 15.71*** 14.95*** 15.47*** 14.24*** 
Under id test: KP LM statistic 58.79*** 57.42*** 58.78*** 57.20*** 58.79*** 57.42*** 58.78*** 57.20*** 
AR chi-squared test 35.49*** 35.13*** 35.65*** 35.32*** 37.26*** 36.73*** 37.62*** 36.96*** 
Hansen J-test 4.39 (0.11) 3.37 (0.19) 4.37 (0.11) 3.43 (0.18) 4.17 (0.12) 3.32 (0.19) 4.20 (0.12) 3.40 (0.18) 









Financial inclusion and banking stability: robustness checks 
  Tercile 1: the lowest 
financial inclusion 
Tercile 2: medium financial 
inclusion 
Tercile 3: the highest 
financial inclusion 
Commercial banks: 
Cooperative and Islamic 
banks excluded 
Rest of the sample: Japan 




  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Variables log(Zscore) -log(sd(ROA) log(Zscore) -log(sd(ROA) log(Zscore) -log(sd(ROA) log(Zscore) -log(sd(ROA) log(Zscore) -log(sd(ROA) log(Zscore) -log(sd(ROA) 
Loan Ratio 0.591* 0.341 0.282 0.063 1.626*** 1.760*** 0.462* 0.27 0.339 0.176 0.376 0.113 
 [0.309] [0.308] [0.372] [0.355] [0.483] [0.471] [0.260] [0.249] [0.249] [0.237] [0.315] [0.293] 
Bank Size 0.715*** 0.660*** 0.381*** 0.453*** 0.678*** 0.613*** -0.001 0.049 0.103 0.143 -0.075 -0.037 
 [0.140] [0.131] [0.138] [0.133] [0.202] [0.192] [0.102] [0.097] [0.093] [0.088] [0.137] [0.129] 
Loan Loss Provision -3.722*** -3.286*** -5.561*** -4.944*** -0.366 -0.591 -1.181 -1.237 -1.328 -1.355 -3.770*** -3.451*** 
 [0.926] [0.951] [1.344] [1.228] [0.916] [0.894] [1.036] [0.927] [1.070] [0.950] [0.944] [0.898] 
Income Diversification 0.191 0.173 0.129 0.159 -0.002 -0.001 0.236* 0.228** 0.046 0.071 0.486** 0.461** 
 [0.176] [0.163] [0.146] [0.129] [0.009] [0.010] [0.126] [0.109] [0.069] [0.057] [0.224] [0.190] 
Management Quality 0.337 0.255 1.942*** 1.535** 0.791 0.355 1.346*** 1.111*** 1.502*** 1.243*** 1.864*** 1.700*** 
 [0.424] [0.412] [0.744] [0.754] [1.018] [0.898] [0.406] [0.393] [0.392] [0.378] [0.542] [0.518] 
Capitalisation 2.525*** -0.064 3.883*** 1.233* 7.493*** 3.961*** 1.469*** -1.000** 2.067*** -0.481 1.652*** -0.806* 
 [0.701] [0.635] [0.789] [0.726] [1.859] [1.507] [0.444] [0.407] [0.437] [0.396] [0.527] [0.478] 
E-Lerner 0.196 -0.12 0.31 0.028 2.605*** 1.931*** 1.162*** 0.790*** 1.052*** 0.689*** 1.079*** 0.738*** 
 [0.219] [0.208] [0.213] [0.196] [0.320] [0.290] [0.177] [0.168] [0.164] [0.155] [0.236] [0.226] 
Financial Inclusion  -11.597** -10.137** 13.601*** 12.266*** 26.586*** 24.286*** 8.081*** 7.833*** 7.998*** 7.697*** 6.386*** 6.381*** 
 [4.724] [4.471] [4.720] [4.399] [8.511] [8.019] [2.241] [2.119] [2.166] [2.045] [2.227] [2.110] 
GDP Growth Rate -1.237 -0.942 2.066 1.654 2.688 3.104 5.634*** 5.464*** 6.033*** 5.830*** 3.831*** 3.683*** 
 [1.246] [1.204] [1.413] [1.316] [2.448] [2.305] [0.906] [0.854] [0.810] [0.764] [0.927] [0.880] 
Per Capita GDP 4.154*** 3.613*** -5.649*** -5.542*** -7.808 -7.285 -2.222** -2.287*** -2.677*** -2.654*** -1.454* -1.544* 
 [1.387] [1.339] [2.065] [1.914] [5.156] [4.925] [0.866] [0.825] [0.874] [0.831] [0.838] [0.802] 
Observations 3,223 3,223 4,123 4,123 3,938 3,938 5,516 5,516 6,390 6,390 3,439 3,439 
Number of banks 733 733 995 995 678 678 1,117 1,117 1,283 1,283 708 708 
2nd-stage F-test 10.54*** 9.03*** 14.76*** 17.69*** 33.53*** 31.13*** 17.56*** 15.96*** 20.0*** 18.02*** 12.13*** 11.5*** 
Under id test: KP LM statistic 35.69*** 35.69*** 24.14*** 24.14*** 40.69*** 40.69*** 41.32*** 41.32*** 44.4*** 44.4*** 29.2*** 29.2*** 
Hansen J-test 0.21 (0.90) 0.21 (0.90) 0.84 (0.36) 2.23 (0.14) 0.23 (0.64) 1.37 (0.24) 0.38 (0.54) 0.75 (0.39) 0.89 (0.35) 1.17 (0.28) 0.81 (0.37) 1.34 (0.25) 
Endogeneity test 4.71*** 3.87*** 18.73*** 18.67*** 5.11*** 3.76*** 29.14*** 27.63*** 28.85*** 26.97*** 19.27*** 19.61*** 
This table reports robustness tests of financial inclusion and banking stability. We use as usual IV-GMM estimators. In the first six columns, we split the sample into three terciles based on financial 
inclusion index and re-run regressions. In this case, we use investment freedom, entry density and investment freedom times entry density as instruments. The validity of the instruments is confirmed by 
the under-identification and over-identification tests reported at the bottom of the table. In the columns 7 and 8, we dropped observations of the cooperative and Islamic banks keeping only commercial 
banks. In the last two columns, we dropped observations of Japan and Italy as they comprise lion shares of our sample and re-run regressions. For the specification of 7, 8, 9 and 10, we use financial 
freedom and entry density as the instruments. The results of the first-stage regressions are available from the authors upon request. The analogous bank and macro controls are used as in equation (6). We 




Financial inclusion, external finance dependence, small firm share, and growth 
The dependent variable is the growth rate in real value added for 2000-2010 for each industry in each country, using data from UNIDO 
INDSTAT4, 2010. Industrial sectors in US is excluded from the analysis as it serves as the benchmark (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). In column 
1-4, estimation is by ordinary least squares (OLS) while column 5-8 is by instrumental variables (IV) technique. Unreported country and 
industry dummies are included in OLS and IV, respectively. Instrumental variable include investment freedom index is from the Heritage 
Foundation, adults borrowing from a formal financial institution in the past year to total adults (borrowing) is from Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Klapper (2012), and interaction of investment freedom and borrowing. Note that first-stage regression and other controls are not reported but 
available upon request from the authors. Share in value added is the industry’s share of total value added in manufacturing in 2000. External 
finance dependence is a measure of the industry’s dependence on external finance, from Rajan and Zingales (1998). It is the fraction of capital 
expenditures not financed with internal funds. Small firm share is the industry’s share of employment by firms with less than N employees (N 
is either 5 or 10 or 20) is taken from Beck et al. (2008). BDLL (2008) calculate these industry-level variables by using data from the US 
Census on all US firms for the year 1997. Legal efficiency is the country’s efficiency of the legal system from La Porta et al. (1998), which is 
taken from Beck et al. (2008). Property rights is a measure of the country’s protection of property rights from the Heritage Foundation (average 
for the years 2004-2012). Credit information depth is the measure of degree to which credit information is available through either a public 
credit registry or a private credit bureau from Djankov et al. (2007), World Bank “Doing Business” Database (average for the years 2004-
2012). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in the brackets. *, **, *** Represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. 
  Annual (compounded) growth rate in real value added 
VARIABLES OLS IV 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Share in value added in 2000 0.026 0.053 0.05 0.074 -0.219 -0.187 -0.181 -0.171 
 [0.094] [0.101] [0.101] [0.097] [0.161] [0.173] [0.170] [0.167] 
Financial inclusion X External 
finance dependence 
0.020**    0.293**    
[0.010]    [0.121]    
Financial inclusion X Small firm 
share (< 5 employees) 
 0.864**    14.264**   
 [0.354]    [5.675]   
Financial inclusion X Small firm 
share (<10 employees) 
  0.345***    5.277**  
  [0.132]    [2.049]  
Financial inclusion X Small firm 
share (< 20 employees) 
   0.133**    2.425*** 
   [0.065]    [0.870] 
Constant 0.365*** 0.367*** 0.368*** 0.364*** 0.485*** 0.502*** 0.499*** 0.517*** 
 [0.131] [0.142] [0.142] [0.138] [0.076] [0.086] [0.084] [0.081] 
Observations 672 578 578 603 646 556 556 580 
Country controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.20 0.16 0.19 0.23 
F 16.38*** 13.63*** 13.68*** 14.34*** 8.83*** 8.20*** 8.38*** 8.78*** 
Under id test: KP LM statistic     23.06*** 23.16*** 25.14*** 31.19*** 
Hansen J-test (p-value)     6.25 (0.04) 3.77 (0.15) 3.734 (0.16) 3.19 (0.2) 
























The causal effects of enabling inclusive financial environment on banking stability 
This table presents difference-in-differences (Panel A) and Matching (Panel B) estimations relating pro-financial access policy and bank 
stability. In Panel A, the dependent variables are the log(Zscore) and –log(sd(ROA)). The variable of interest is Pro-financial Access Policy, 
that takes one if a country enters into the global network of financial inclusion policymakers (i.e., Alliance for Financial Inclusion) and agrees 
to share knowledge for developing and implementing more effective policies designed to expand access to financial services in year t and 
thereafter or else zero. The analogous bank- and country-specific controls are used with a set of year dummies. To get homogenous comparison 
groups, we use a nearest-neighbor logit propensity score matching strategy to identify control groups which are similar to the treated groups 
on the basis of observable characteristics, and then run difference-in-differences regression on the matched sample. While we use country 
fixed effects in column 1-4, bank fixed effects is used in column 5-8. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country-level. In Panel B, 
we use three different matching methods include Kernel matching, Stratification matching and the nearest-neighbour bias-corrected matching 
estimators proposed by Abadie and Imbens (2006). Abadie and Imbens method adjusts the differences within the matches for the differences 
in covariate values. ATT is the average treatment effect for the treated. The standard errors in Abadie and Imbens are heteroskedasticity-
consistent, and z-stats are reported. For the rest, we report absolute values of bootstrapped t-stats in bracket. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Source: BankScope and AFI. Coverage: 2004-2012. 
 Panel A: DID approach log(Zscore) -log(sd(ROA) log(Zscore) -log(sd(ROA) 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Pro-financial Access Policy 0.314** 0.270* 0.385**
 
0.274** 0.341** 0.311** 0.310* 0.254 
 [0.123] [0.136] [0.124] [0.135] [0.152] [0.148] [0.157] [0.161] 
Loan Ratio  0.793***  0.580**  0.632  0.402 
  [0.243]  [0.226]  [0.566]  [0.625] 
Bank Size  0.066**  0.122**
 
 0.289  0.269 
  [0.029]  [0.022]  [0.188]  [0.171] 
Loan Loss Provision  -7.652***  -
 
 -5.066***  -
 
  [1.328]  [1.045]  [1.273]  [1.324] 
Income Diversification  -0.114  -0.453  0.207  0.192 
  [0.345]  [0.296]  [0.498]  [0.522] 
Management Quality  0.232  0.289  0.019  0.157 
  [0.369]  [0.342]  [0.769]  [0.766] 
Capitalisation  1.836***  -
 
 1.535  -1.255 
  [0.515]  [0.433]  [1.326]  [1.306] 
E-Lerner  0.107  -0.334  0.156  -0.165 
  [0.263]  [0.218]  [0.342]  [0.331] 
GDP Growth Rate  0.283  -0.182  0.19  0.117 
  [1.465]  [1.349]  [1.208]  [1.260] 
Per Capita GDP  0.83  1.109  1.633  1.462 
  [1.123]  [1.142]  [1.246]  [1.333] 
Constant 3.381*** -4.184 5.368**
 
-3.916 3.379*** -11.792 5.443**
 
-7.799 
 [0.114] [8.554] [0.108] [8.698] [0.132] [9.368] [0.124] [10.095] 
Observations 2,071 2,027 2,071 2,027 2,071 2,027 2,071 2,027 
Bank fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.23 0.23 0.36 0.61 0.63 0.64 0.65 
F-statistics 5.32 14.71 4.16 24.04 4.80 3.67 2.57 2.44 
 Panel B: Matching estimator Kernel Stratified Abadie-Imbens 
Treatment effects log(Zscore) -log(sd(ROA) log(Zscore) -log(sd(ROA) log(Zscore) -log(sd(ROA) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
ATT 0.109** 0.088** 0.114*** 0.081* 0.889*** 1.267*** 
S.E. [0.045] [0.041] [0.039] [0.043] [0.308] [0.252] 
t-stat [2.430] [2.164] [2.952] [1.871] [2.886] [5.028] 
Observations 13,836 13,836 13,836 13,836 13,524 13,524 
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This paper offers a first empirical investigation on the complementary effect of inclusive 
finance on soundness of individual banks. Using a unique database of financial access survey, 
we construct a composite index of financial inclusion for 87 countries over the period 2004 to 
2012, and then investigate a new research question as to whether the global policy drive 
towards greater financial inclusion is good for bank stability in a sample of 2,913 banks. We 
find that higher level of financial inclusion leads to greater bank stability. This complementary 
effect is more pronounced when banks have higher market power and operate in countries 
where political stability, rule of law, and regulatory environment are stronger. Exploiting cross-
country and temporal variations in the timing of inclusive banking agenda, we show that 
enabling inclusive financial environment increases soundness of banks in the treated countries 
by 36%. Taking industry data, we also show that financial inclusion exerts disproportionately 
more positive effects on growth of small firms, and firms that rely more on external finance. 
Our results highlight that the importance of ensuring inclusive financial system is not only a 
development goal but also an issue that should be prioritised by banks as such a policy drive is 

























Principal Component analysis (PCA) 
Using individual dimension in an equation may provide incomprehensive picture of 
financial inclusion. In addition, modelling various dimensions of financial inclusion in the 
same equation would lead to multicollinearity. We use PCA to combine these dimensions 
together and create an index of financial inclusion. Using PCA to construct indices is well-
documented in several papers (see Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; Bali, Brown and Caglayan, 
2014). It is a multivariate statistical technique used to reduce a large number of variables in a 
data set into a smaller number of ‘dimensions’ (i.e., principal components) by parsing any 
redundancies among the original variables while retaining most of the variance in the original 
variables.1 In mathematical terms, from an initial set of n  correlated variables, PCA generates 
uncorrelated principal components ( )iPC , where each component is a linear weighted 
combination of the original variables and components themselves are orthogonal to each other. 
It can be shown as:  
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Which can be re-written as 
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Where 1 2  [ , , , ]mP P P P= …  are the principal components; 
  [ ]   (1, 2, , ) and    (1, 2, , )ijW w for i m j n= = … = …  are component loadings or weights; and 
1 2 = [X , , , ]nX X X are the original variables. The eigenvectors of the correlation matrix is 
proportional to the weights of each principal component, and it reflects the variance 
contribution of principal components to original variables. The eigenvalue of the analogous 
eigenvector is the variance for each principal component. The components are ranked, and they 
are extracted in decreasing order of importance so that the first component 1( )PC  explains the 
largest possible amount of variations in the original data conditional to the constraint that the 
sum of the squared weights 2 2 211 12 1( )nw w w+ + +  is equal to one. The second component 2( )PC  is 
entirely uncorrelated with the first component and explains the second largest variations, less 
than the first component, subject to the same constraint. The subsequent components are 
1 See Jolliffe (2002) for a detailed discussion on PCA. 
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independent from the previous components and explain smaller and smaller proportions of the 
variation of the original data. The greater correlation among original variables necessitates 
fewer principal components to capture common information.  
It is noted that principal component can be extracted by using original variables or by 
their deviations from their averages, or by the standardised variables.2 As the indicators of 
financial inclusion are measured in different units, we deem to follow the latter approach in 
this study. We use the following equation to construct the composite index of financial 








= ∑    (E1.3) 
Section E2  
Estimating marginal cost using a translog cost function  
The inputs and outputs choices are specified according to the intermediation approach 
of Sealey and Lindley (1977). Following Koetter, Kolari and Spierdijk (2012), a production 
technology is specified with three inputs (i.e., labour, capital and borrowed funds) and one 
output (i.e., total assets). Since the information on the prices of loans and deposits are limited, 
we use total assets as an aggregate measure of banking activity, as previously used by Berger, 
Klapper and Turk-Ariss (2009) and Beck, De Jonghe and Schepens (2013). We include equity 
in the production function to account for various risk attitudes of banks. The following translog 
total cost function is specified for bank 1,...,i N=  at time 1,...,t T=  as: 
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2 We used standardized variables with mean of zero and standard deviation of one instead of min-max 
normalisation and construct financial inclusion index. These two indices are perfectly correlated, indicating the 
robustness of our index.  
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where itTOC  is the total costs including financial and operating cost; itQ  represents for one 
output i.e., total assets, and ,j itW  ( 3,2,1=j ) are input prices where 1W  is the price of funds; 2W  
is the price of labour; 3W  is the price of capital of bank i  at time t  ; itZ  is total equity of bank 
i  at time t  ; and trend  is the time trend to capture technical change. We impose homogeneity 
of degree one on input prices and divided all factor prices and itTOC  by  3W  . The marginal 
cost is measured by taking the first derivative with respect to output for each bank in the sample 
after estimating cost function as:  
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The shortcoming of conventional Lerner index estimated above is that it is measured 
assuming full bank efficiency and therefore it fails to account for the possibilities of bankers 
inabilities to exploit output pricing opportunities resulting from market power. Following 
Koetter, Kolari and Spierdijk (2012), we estimate efficiency-adjusted Lerner indices from a 
single structural model as: 
 
 ( ) /it it itAR MC AR−      (E2.3) 
  
Where itAR  is the average revenue computed as  / ,TR TA  Where,  TR PBT TOC= + . In order to 
obtain efficiency-adjusted Lerner indices we have to estimate expected profit PBT  from an 
alternative profit function3 and expected total costs TOC  from equation (B1). Dissimilar to 
conventional Lerner indices in equation (5), the estimation of efficiency-adjusted Lerner 
accounts for both bank efficiency and degree of market power simultaneously.     
  
3 To estimate expected profits (PBT ) we use PBT  (i.e. profit before tax) instead of TOC  in equation (B1) as the 
dependent variable. Following (Bos and Koetter (2011)), to account for individual bank losses, we use a negative 
profit indicator ( NPI ) in the profit function as many banks in our sample period incurred losses. 
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Table E1 
Descriptive statistics of the variables included in the cost and profit functions.  
Source: BankScope.  
Region Cost Profit Assets w1 w2 w3 Equity   
Asia 8.9 7.1 7.6 -5.0 -4.7 -5.0 5.0 Mean 
 8.8 6.9 7.6 -5.5 -4.8 -5.2 4.8 Median 
 1.9 2.3 1.7 1.7 0.6 0.7 1.7 SD 
 2.9 -2.6 2.6 -7.6 -8.1 -7.7 0.9 Min. 
 14.4 13.6 12.6 -1.6 -1.4 -0.9 9.7 Max. 
Europe 8.3 6.3 6.8 -3.8 -4.5 -4.6 4.5 Mean 
 7.8 5.9 6.4 -3.7 -4.4 -4.7 4.2 Median 
 2.2 2.3 2.0 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.8 SD 
 2.7 -2.2 2.6 -7.6 -11.6 -9.5 0.9 Min. 
 17.4 14.8 12.6 -1.6 -1.2 0.8 9.7 Max. 
Americas 7.6 5.8 6.3 -3.0 -3.9 -3.7 4.3 Mean 
 7.6 5.9 6.3 -3.0 -3.8 -3.7 4.2 Median 
 2.1 2.5 2.0 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.8 SD 
 3.0 -3.0 2.6 -7.3 -8.8 -8.3 0.9 Min. 
 14.5 13.2 12.6 -1.6 -0.8 -0.5 9.7 Max. 
Africa 7.4 6.1 6.2 -3.5 -4.0 -3.9 4.0 Mean 
 7.2 6.1 6.1 -3.3 -3.9 -3.7 3.9 Median 
 2.0 2.4 1.7 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.6 SD 
 2.9 -2.0 2.6 -7.6 -8.5 -8.4 0.9 Min. 
 14.1 13.4 11.8 -1.6 -1.9 -1.4 9.0 Max. 
Total 8.4 6.5 7.0 -4.0 -4.5 -4.5 4.6 Mean 
 8.1 6.3 6.8 -3.7 -4.5 -4.7 4.4 Median 
 2.1 2.4 1.9 1.4 0.8 0.9 1.8 SD 
 2.7 -3.0 2.6 -7.6 -11.6 -9.5 0.9 Min. 
  17.4 14.8 12.6 -1.6 -0.8 0.8 9.7 Max. 
The dataset comprises of 2913 banks in 87 countries. 






This table provides information on the correlation between the bank- and country-specific variables used throughout the paper. 
Panel A: Correlation matrix of bank level variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8         
C-Lerner 1 1                       
E-Lerner 2 0.67*** 1           
Loan Ratio 3 0.11*** 0.02** 1          
Bank Size 4 0.04*** -0.09*** 0.02* 1         
Loan Loss Provision 5 0 0.02* -0.05*** -0.03** 1        
Income Diversification 6 0.04*** 0.06*** -0.05*** -0.01 0.02* 1       
Management Quality 7 -0.05*** -0.19*** 0.21*** 0.10*** -0.13*** -0.08*** 1      
Capitalisation 8 0.07*** 0.28*** -0.06*** -0.37*** 0.11*** 0.07*** -0.29*** 1         
Panel B: Correlation matrix of country level variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Financial inclusion index 1 1            
GDP Growth Rate 2 -0.43*** 1           
Per Capita GDP 3 0.70*** -0.51*** 1          
Voice and accountability  4 0.58*** -0.41*** 0.77*** 1         
Political stability  5 0.57*** -0.36*** 0.80*** 0.75*** 1        
Government effectiveness  6 0.66*** -0.33*** 0.82*** 0.80*** 0.80*** 1       
Regulatory quality  7 0.60*** -0.42*** 0.85*** 0.86*** 0.80*** 0.92*** 1      
Rule of law  8 0.63*** -0.35*** 0.82*** 0.84*** 0.82*** 0.97*** 0.94*** 1     
Control of corruption  9 0.62*** -0.29*** 0.79*** 0.79*** 0.80*** 0.97*** 0.89*** 0.97*** 1    
Institutional quality index  10 0.65*** -0.38*** 0.86*** 0.89*** 0.88*** 0.97*** 0.96*** 0.98*** 0.96*** 1   
Property rights 11 0.56*** -0.27*** 0.76*** 0.81*** 0.75*** 0.95*** 0.89*** 0.96*** 0.95*** 0.94*** 1  





First-stage regression: Financial inclusion 
Variables Dependent variable: Financial inclusion 
1 2 3 4 
Financial freedom 0.0017*** 0.0018*** 0.0020*** 0.0020*** 
 [6.62] [6.74] [6.98] [7.00] 
Entry density 0.0035*** 0.0034*** 0.0079*** 0.0074*** 
 [6.92] [6.77] [5.80] [5.51] 
Financial freedom x Entry density   -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
   [-3.39] [-3.13] 
C-Lerner -0.0080**  -0.0083***  
 [-2.55]  [-2.64]  
E-Lerner  -0.0348***  -0.0343*** 
    [-5.42]   [-5.37] 
Observations 11,499 11,499 11,499 11,499 
Bank and Macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank and Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 
F-statistics 86.42 86.73 82.21 82.72 
Note: This table reports regressions of financial inclusion on financial freedom, entry density and financial 
freedom times entry density. In order to make our identification strategy as transparent as possible, we also report 
(in column 1 and 2) the regression results that exclude interaction term in the specification. All regressions include 
bank-specific and country-specific controls as in equation (6), except financial inclusion. All regressions also 
include bank fixed effect and year fixed effects. Unreported heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent 





























Table E4  
G20 Principles for Innovative Financial Inclusion and the Commitments of the Maya 
Declaration 
Panel A G20 Principles for Innovative Financial Inclusion 
Leadership Cultivate a broad-based government commitment to financial inclusion to help alleviate poverty 
Diversity Implement policy approaches that promote competition and provide market-based incentives for delivery 
of sustainable financial access and usage of a broad range of affordable services (savings, credit, 
payments and transfers, insurance) as well as a diversity of service providers 
Innovation Promote technological and institutional innovation as a means to expand financial system access and 
usage, including by addressing infrastructure weakness  
Protection Encourage a comprehensive approach to consumer protection that recognises the roles of government, 
providers, and consumers 
Empowerment Develop financial literacy and financial capability 
Cooperation Create an institutional environment with clear lines of accountability and coordination within 
government; and also encourage partnerships and direct consultation across government, business, and 
other stakeholders 
Knowledge Utilise improved data to make evidence-based policy, measure progress, and consider an incremental 
‘test and learn’ approach acceptable to both regulator and service provider  
Proportionality Build a policy and regulatory framework that is proportionate with the risks and benefits involved in 
such innovative products and services and is based on an understanding of the gaps and barriers in 
existing regulation 
Framework Consider the following in the regulatory framework, reflecting international standards, national 
circumstances, and support for a competitive landscape: an appropriate, flexible, risk-based Anti-Money 
Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism ML/CFT) regime; conditions for the use of agents 
as a customer interface; a clear regulatory regime for electronically stored value; and market-based 
incentives to achieve the long-term goal of broad interoperability and interconnection 
Panel B Four commitments of the Maya Declaration 
1 Create an enabling environment to harness new technology that increases access and lowers costs of 
financial services 
2 Implement a proportional framework that advances synergies in financial inclusion, integrity, and 
stability. 
3 Integrate consumer protection and empowerment as a key pillar of financial inclusion. 
4 Utilise data for informed policymaking and tracing results 


















The propensity score matching analysis: Logit model and balancing tests 
Variables coefficients z-statistics Treated Control t-stats p-value 
Log of total assets  0.590*** [0.123] 6.66 6.92 -1.07 0.29 
log of per capita GDP -1.265*** [0.179] 7.31 7.44 -0.69 0.49 
GDP growth rate -0.117 [3.262] 0.05 0.05 0.32 0.75 
Financial freedom 0.008 [0.013] 49.49 50.47 -0.44 0.66 
Regulatory Quality 0.163 [0.341] -0.18 -0.15 -0.25 0.8 
Constant 3.862*** [1.374]     
Observations 539           
Chi-squared  95.42***       
Pseudo R-squared 0.19       
Hosmer–Lemeshow test (p-value) 0.3       
Standard deviation of the propensity score 0.17           
Note: The dependent variable, AFI takes the value of 1 for a country which participate in the AFI network in year 2009 and thereafter, or else 
zero. The detailed description of the independent variables is given in Table 1. Z-statistics are reported on brackets. The Hosmer–Lemeshow 
test confirms the goodness-of fit of logit model. Regarding balancing tests, we conduct t-tests of each of independent variables used in the 
logit model. T-stats and P-values are reported along with respective values of the treated and control groups of the entire sample. Based on p-
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note: we collpase data at the country level to get average score of financial index
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